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ARTICLES
THE "SMALL BEGINNINGS" OF EUTHANASIA:
EXAMINING THE EROSION IN LEGAL
PROHIBITIONS AGAINST MERCY-KILLING
C. EVERETT Koop, M.D, Sc.D.*
and
EDWARD R. GRANT, J.D.**
The day will come when people will be able to carry a card, nota-
rized and legally executed, which explains that they do not want
to be kept alive beyond the humanum point, and authorizing the
ending of their biological processes by any of the methods of eutha-
nasia which seems appropriate. Suicide may or may not be the
ultimate problem of philosophy, as Albert Camus thought it is, but
in any case it is the ultimate problem of medical ethics."
Rev. Joseph Fletcher (1973)
* Surgeon General, United States Public Health Service, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for Health, United States Department of Health and
Human Services; formerly Surgeon-in-Chief, Children's Hospital of Phila-
delphia. Dr. Koop wishes to dedicate this article to the memory of Dr. Leo
Alexander, a neuropsychiatrist and professor at Tufts University, who died
on July 20, 1985. The importance of Dr. Alexander's work is briefly re-
viewed in note 10, infra.
** Executive Director and General Counsel, Americans United for
Life Legal Defense Fund, Chicago. The authors wish to acknowledge the
research assistance of Mary Elizabeth Krane, and the editorial assistance of
Maura K. Quinlan, Esq., Clarke D. Forsythe, Esq., and Ann-Louise Lohr,
Esq.
1. J. FLETCHER, To LIVE AND TO DIE: WHEN, WHY, AND How 122
(1973). Fletcher's humanum point is that point beyond which the rational
faculty of man is lost; in physiological terms, the loss of function in the
cerebral cortex. Id. at 115. The humanum point, therefore, is to be distin-
guished from the concept of "whole brain death," or irreversible loss of all
functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, which is the ac-
cepted standard for diagnosis of death by neurological criteria. See infra
notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
A brief excursion into Fletcher's arguments on behalf of legalized eutha-
nasia is warranted by the dedication of this essay to Dr. Leo Alexander.
Fletcher dismisses out of hand all opposing arguments which recall the out-
come of this century's most ambitious foray into legalized euthanasia.
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Social and legal trends indicate that the present genera-
tion of Americans will decide whether Fletcher's prophecy
comes to pass. The public debate initiated in the case of
Karen Quinlan2 has now gone beyond the proposition of al-
lowing the terminally ill to "die well." Now, the question is
what to do about the "biologically tenacious" individuals who
simply do not die within an acceptable time frame, as deter-
mined by their families or society.' Increasing support is seen
for the legalization of acts taken (or not taken) with the di-
rect intent of causing the death of the patient. In 1986, legis-
lation will be introduced to permit the "living will" to be uti-
lized, not only to direct the removal of life-prolonging
medical treatment, but to permit the administration by physi-
"Vestigal last-ditch pro-vitalists still mumble threateningly about 'what the
Nazis did,' but in fact the Nazis never engaged in euthanasia or mercy-
killing; what they did was merciless killing, either genocidal or for ruthless
experimental purposes." Id. at 113-14. Fletcher shows little respect for his
opponents or their arguments; more importantly, he distorts the historical
record upon which these arguments are based. As Dr. Alexander painstak-
ingly chronicled after his experience at the Nuremberg trials, the German
experiment with euthanasia was well in place years before Hitler came to
power. Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEW ENG. J. MED.
39 (1949). "It is rather significant that the German people were considered
by their Nazi leaders more ready to accept the exterminations of the sick
than those for political reasons. It was for that reason that the first exter-
mination of the latter group were carried out under the guise of sickness."
Id. at 41. See also R. LIFTON, THE NAzi DocTORs 45-51 (1986).
A prevalent response to such evidence is that it "can't happen here."
The rejoinder of Professor Yale Kamisar to this argument is a powerful
reminder of the price a society must pay for such security.
Well, maybe it cannot, but no small part of our Constitution and
no small number of our Supreme Court opinions stem from that it
can happen here unless we darn well make sure that it does not by ada-
mantly holding the line, by swiftly snuffing out what are or might
be small beginnings of what we do not want to happen here. To
flick off. . . the fears about legalized euthanasia as so much non-
sense, as a chimerical "parade of horrors," is to sweep away much
of the ground on which all our civil liberties rest.
Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legisla-
tion, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969, 1038 (1958).
2. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom.
Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
3. [A] denial of nutrition may in the long run become the only
effective way to make certain that a large number of biologically
tenacious patients actually die. Given the increasingly large pool of
superanuated, chronically ill, physically marginal elderly, it could
well become the nontreatment of choice . . . . [B]ecause we have
now become sufficiently habituated to the idea of turning off a res-
pirator, we are psychologically prepared to go one step further.
Callahan, On Feeding the Dying, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 22.
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cians of "aid in dying," such as the injection of lethal drugs.4
In the courts, patients, families, physicians and hospitals
wrangle over whether the withdrawal of life-prolonging treat-
ment can be extended to include mechanical means of nutri-
tion and hydration.5 The public policy debate over the provi-
4. A claim that such legislation would be drafted and introduced in
three states-Arizona, California, and Florida-appeared in the Autumn,
1985 edition of Hemlock Quarterly, the newsletter of the Hemlock Society.
The following edition of Hemlock Quarterly set forth a series of sweeping
amendments to the California Natural Death Act, CAL HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1985), and to relevant portions of the
state Penal Code. The essence of the amendments would be to ease the
procedural requirements for executing a directive to have life-sustaining
procedures withdrawn or withheld, and to permit a request for direct "aid-
in-dying" to be carried out by a physician. "Aid-in-dying" is defined in the
Hemlock proposal as "any medical procedure that will swiftly, painlessly
and humanely terminate the life of the qualified patient." A request for
mercy-killing under this proposal could be made directly by a competent
patient, or be executed in an advance directive and carried out in the event
that the patient has lost the ability to communicate. Amendments to the
Penal Code would grant immunity to any homicidal act carried out under a
directive to withdraw or withhold medical treatment, or any directive to
provide "aid-in-dying."
Hemlock is the most aggressive of the American organizations which
promote euthanasia, being the only one that openly espouses the legaliza-
tion of active euthanasia. For a discussion of the definition of euthanasia,
and the distinctions between "active" and "passive" euthanasia, see infra
notes 12-25 and accompanying text. The founder of Hemlock, Derek
Humphry, is a former British journalist who assisted in the suicide death of
his first wife, who was suffering from a terminal illness. D. HUMPHRY, JEAN'S
WAY (1981). Two other American groups are affiliated with the "euthana-
sia" or "right to die" movement: the Society for the Right to Die (SRD)
and Concern for Dying (CFD). SRD was originally incorporated in 1938 as
the Euthanasia Society of America, and sponsored legislation at that time
which would have decriminalized the practice of active, voluntary euthana-
sia. Kamisar, supra note 1, at 978-79. SRD assumed its current name in the
mid-1970's, in an attempt to avoid the controversy engendered by the term
"euthanasia." P. MARX, AND Now EUTHANASIA 21 (1985); EUTHANASIA
NEWS, Feb. 1975, at 1 (Publication of Euthanasia Education Council). SRD
remains closely affiliated, however, with the World Federation of Right to
Die Societies, an international organization of groups which espouse active,
voluntary euthanasia. See World Right to Die Newsletter (May 1984). (Pres-
ident of SRD served as president of the World Federation for four years.)
CFD, also a member of the World Federation, was formerly known as the
Euthanasia Education Council, and serves an educational mission, including
the dissemination of "living Wills." See P. MARX, supra, at 23.
5. See, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Pritchard, No. 80125 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Mateo County, filed May 17, 1985) (petition of husband to
obtain withdrawal of life-support, including nutrition and hydration, from
wife, 45, alleged to be in a persistent vegetative state); Brophy v. New Eng-
land Sinai Hosp., Inc., No. 85E0009-GI (Mass. Probate Ct., Norfolk, Oct.
19861
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sion of medical treatment to the elderly and the terminally ill
is now, correctly in our view, seen as a debate over euthana-
sia as a means of "medical management" to meet the per-
sonal, social, and financial pressures that are placed upon the
health care professions in the care of the chronically ill.'
These pressures have grown in the past decade, and will
accelerate in the decades to come. America is aging more
rapidly than at any time in her history. Modern health care,
especially through its technological advances, has expanded
our life expectancies, but cannot deliver affordable, life-af-
firming care to the long-term elderly and disabled. The po-
tential impact of these factors upon public policy may be illus-
trated by comparison to another medico-legal controversy of
recent vintage. Each year, approximately 50,000 infants are
born with life-threatening handicaps,7 and thus, are poten-
tially subject to the "Baby Doe" amendments made to the
federal child abuse statute.8 By the year 2000, in comparison,
there will be 35 million Americans over the age of sixty-five,
and by the year 2020, that number will soar to over 50 mil-
21, 1985) rev'd in relevant part, No. 4152 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Sept. 11,
1986) (petition of wife of 48-year-old man found to be in persistent vegeta-
tive state to direct the withdrawal of a gastrostomy tube); In re Jobes, No.
C-4971-85E (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div., Morris County, Apr. 23, 1986)
(granting petition by husband of severely and permanently brain-damaged
woman, 30 years old, that a jejunostomy tube providing nutrition and hy-
dration to her be removed). The Pritchard case reached a curious resolu-
tion when Dr. Ronald Cranford, an expert neurologist called by plaintiff,
disputed the claim that Mrs. Pritchard was in a persistent vegetative state
(PVS), and diagnosed her as "profoundly demented." The basis for the
distinction is that Mrs. Pritchard retains some measure of cortical function;
she is not, however, diagnosed as having a hope for recovery. San Jose
Mercury News, Dec. 14, 1985, at B1. In the Jobes case, there was contro-
versy over the precise neurological condition of the patient, although there
is agreement that there is very little hope for recovery. See infra notes 136-
39 and accompanying text.
6. Horan, Euthanasia as a Form of Medical Management, in DEATH, DY-
ING, AND EUTHANASIA 196 (2d ed. 1980).
7. This figure is probably a high estimate. Of the 3.5 million births
annually in the United States, approximately one percent are of infants
weighing 1500 grams or less, and two percent have some form of birth
defect, which can range from mild to life-threatening. Assuming that virtu-
ally all infants in the first category are at risk due to low birth weight, and
that a significant number of infants fall into both categories, the estimate
of 50,000 is derived. Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services.
8. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat.
1749 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See also 45 C.F.R. §
1340.15 (1985).
[Vol. 2
"SMALL BEGINNINGS" OF EUTHANASIA
lion. 9 Each of these elderly persons may at some time require
extensive (and expensive) medical care. In short, for every
potential Baby Doe, there will be approximately 15,000
"Granny Does." The impact of this demographic fact is likely
to wield greater influence on the debate over euthanasia than
jurisprudential concerns over the appropriate extent of per-
sonal liberty, patient autonomy, and the state interest in pre-
serving life.
This article will examine whether the legislation and
court decisions which have addressed these problems in re-
cent years have strengthened or weakened existing legal
prohibitions against euthanasia. We will commence with a
brief explanation of the legal definition of euthanasia. Our
substantive discussion will concern three categories of legal
developments: the legislative definition of death, legislation
regarding the "living will," and recent judicial opinions.
Within each of these categories, we will focus on a specific,
representative development for our detailed analysis.
Our thesis is that changes in the obligation to provide
medical treatment to seriously ill and incompetent patients
have created a legal climate that is favorable to euthanasia,
which is the intentional killing, by omission or direct action,
of those whose lives are considered of insufficient value to
maintain. The consequences of fostering such a climate were
compellingly stated by the late Dr. Leo Alexander, a Boston
psychiatrist and professor of medicine who died in 1985. Dr.
Alexander served as a medical consultant at the war-crimes
trials of physicians who participated in the atrocities of the
Nazi regime in Germany. His witness to a depraved aspect of
twentieth-century history is more salient in the America of
1986 than it was in the America of 1948.
Whatever proportions these crimes finally assumed, it
became evident to all who investigated them that they had
started from small beginnings. The beginnings at first were
merely a subtle shift in emphasis in the basic attitude of
physicians. It started with the acceptance of the attitude,
basic in the euthanasia movement, that there is such a thing
as life not worthy to be lived. This attitude in its early
stages concerned itself merely with the severely and chroni-
cally sick. Gradually, the sphere of those to be included in
9. 1985 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, FEDERAL OLD-
AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS,
H.R. Doc. No. 46, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1985).
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this category was enlarged to encompass the socially unpro-
ductive, the ideologically unwanted, and finally all non-
Germans. But it is important to realize that the infinitely
small wedged-in lever from which this entire trend of mind
received its impetus was the attitude toward the
nonrehabilitable sick.10
The legal developments that have taken place in the past
decade offer convincing evidence that American legal institu-
tions in the 1980's are examining precisely the same question
that was addressed so tragically by the legal profession in
Germany in the 1920's: society's attitude towards those who
are chronically sick and infirm. Leo Alexander knew that
American law and medicine could not escape this dilemma, in
10. Alexander, supra note 1, at 44 (emphasis supplied).
Dr. Alexander died on July 20, 1985, at the age of 79. A native of Aus-
tria, he received his medical degree from the University of Vienna in 1929.
He came to the United States in 1933 and held several medical positions in
the Boston area, including one at Harvard Medical School, before being
appointed associate professor of neuropsychiatry at Duke Medical School
in 1941. World War II interrupted his academic career. His military ser-
vice included time with the Eighth Air Force in England, and with an intel-
ligence unit of the Seventh Army. He returned to Boston after his service
in the military.
Dr. Alexander's contribution to the study of euthanasia grew out of his
position after World War II as an aide to Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes at Nuremberg. Out of this work came studies of the social and
psychiatric forces that corrupted the German medical profession during
the Weimar Republic, and overran all of German society during the Nazi
period. See Alexander, The Socio-Psychologic Structure of the SS and the
Criminalization of a Society, 39 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 298 (1948); The
Molding of Personality Under Dictatorship-The Importance of the Destructive
Drives in the Socio-Psychological Structure of Nazism, 40 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 3 (1949); War Crimes: Their Social-Psychological Aspects, 105 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 170 (1948); Sociopsychologic Structure of the SS: Psychiatric Report
of the Niirnberg Trials for War Crimes, 59 ARCHIvES NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIA-
TRY 622 (1948). Dr. Alexander's prolific writing was no doubt aided by his
ability to converse with war crimes defendants as a native speaker of their
mother tongue.
The socio-psychologic aspects of Nazi war crimes may seem of little rele-
vance to the debate on the withdrawal of medical treatment in America in
the 1980s. Alexander penetrated this curtain, however, by seeking the
common sources of "beneficient" euthanasia and mass genocide, and trac-
ing them to the "small beginnings" referred to in the quoted passages
from Medicine Under Dictatorship. He was aware, at the end of his life, of
the dynamic changes in American law and medical ethics that have occured
in recent years. In the last summer of his life, he suggested that "it is much
like Germany in the 20s and 30s. The barriers against killing are coming
down." Hentoff, Barriers Against Killing Are Coming Down, National Right
to Life News, Apr. 10, 1986 (reprinted from Washington Post).
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part because, even forty years ago, the signs of a utilitarian
medical ethic were present in our society.
The killing center is the reductio ad absurdum of all
health planning based only on rational principles and econ-
omy and not on humane compassion and divine law. To be
sure, American physicians are still far from the point of
thinking of killing centers, but they have arrived at a dan-
ger point in thinking, at which likelihood of full rehabilita-
tion is considered a factor that should determine the
amount of time, effort and cost to be devoted to a particu-
lar type of patient on the part of the social body upon
which this decision rests. At this point Americans should re-
member that the enormity of a euthanasia movement is pre-
sent in their own midst."'
In the past decade, a reawakened euthanasia movement
has achieved a great deal in changing the stance of American
law towards the terminally ill, the chronically comatose, and
more importantly, the desirability of hastening death for such
medically dependent patients. We hope by this article to
serve the memory of Leo Alexander by identifying the
sources and extent of this change in the law, and to offer pro-
posals whereby greater erosion in our law against euthanasia
may be averted.
I. A MEDICO-LEGAL DEFINITION OF EUTHANASIA
In 1958, the year Professor Yale Kamisar published Some
Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legisla-
tion,12 there was no confusion as to the subject matter of the
debate. In fact, Kamisar simply used the terms "euthanasia,"
"voluntary euthanasia," "involuntary euthanasia" and
"mercy-killing" as if there were no need of further defini-
tion.' Kamisar's critics found much to fault in his arguments,
but did not criticize his terminology."'
There is no such luxury in the current discussion. In-
stead of a clear-cut discussion of whether or not voluntary
euthanasia ought to be legalized, we are confronted with
11. Alexander, supra note 1, at 46-47.
12. Kamisar, supra note 1.
13. Kamisar's principle object was not to define euthanasia, since the
proponents of euthanasia at that time were more forthcoming in their
objectives than they are today.
14. See, e.g., Williams, "Mercy-Killing" Legislation-A Rejoinder, 43
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1958).
1986J
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questions such as the "right to die" and "natural death" and
"death with dignity." In part, this change reflects the evolu-
tion of social concern and the medical context of the debate.
In the first three decades in which euthanasia societies were
active in the United States, the profile of the average candi-
date for euthanasia was that of a terminally ill patient, af-
flicted with a chronic disease such as cancer, and suffering
from intractable pain, not amenable to relief by medication.
1 5
The solution proposed by the proponents of voluntary eutha-
nasia was direct intervention to end the life of the patient.
Much has happened in the last twenty-five years to
change that picture. More than any other event, the case of
Karen Quinlan shifted the focus in the euthanasia debate
from the dying cancer patient to the chronically impaired
and bedridden individual, and from a direct, life-taking inter-
vention to the withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging
treatments.' 6 As a result, the current debate concerns not
only the alleged desire of certain patients to kill themselves
or be killed by active means, but also the wish to die without
the intervention of life-prolonging measures.'
7
Regardless of the condition of the patient, however, the
fundamental elements of euthanasia remain the same. We
utilize this term to mean the wilful and deliberate killing of
oneself or another out of motives of compassion, the desire
to save another from suffering, or to promote "the dignity"
15. See Kamisar, supra note 1, at 993-1005. Kamisar notes that the
pool of candidates for euthanasia has not been restricted to "rational" in-
curable patients, but has been extended by some proponents to include the
"insane" and otherwise "defective." Id. at 995. Dr. 0. Ruth Russell, writ-
ing in the 1970's, advocated involuntary euthanasia for a wide range of
impaired elderly and infant persons. O.R. RUSSELL, FREEDOM TO DIE 236-51
(rev. ed. 1976).
16. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom.
Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See Gelfand, Euthanasia and the
Terminally I1, 63 NEB. L. REV. 741 (1984).
17. Professor Gelfand is skeptical that a reliable line can be drawn
between the withdrawal of "extraordinary" measures from terminally ill
patients, and the practice of mercy-killing. Gelfand, supra note 16, at 774-
76. While in agreement with much of Gelfand's thesis, the authors contend
that there is a very real distinction between the legitimate withdrawal of
non-beneficial or unduly burdensome medical treatment, based on the
medical indications of a given case, and mercy-killing by passive means.
This line, admittedly, is difficult to draw. However, it is a line that is often
blurred by the proponents of euthanasia, such as Joseph Fletcher, whose
cause stands to benefit from confusion on this issue. See, Horan, Euthanasia
and Brain Death: Ethical and Legal Considerations 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCi.
363, 370 (1978).
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of the suffering person.18
Euthanasia is thus a form of homicide in which particular
factors of intent and motive are present. These factors in no
way exonerate the individual who has committed the homi-
cide; nor does the fact that the homicide was committed by a
negative rather than a positive act. These clarifications are
important for several reasons. First is to maintain the tradi-
tional understanding of the law that motive does not excuse
an act of euthanasia. 19 Proponents of euthanasia have argued
that the special factors of humanitarian motive and intent
ought to remove acts of euthanasia from the jurisdiction of
the criminal law.20 The law has consistently rejected this
point of view, and insists that a "mercy-killing" is no different
from any other kind of homicide.2 In State v. Ehlers, the New
Jersey court stated: "If the proved facts established that the
defendant did the killing wilfully, that is, with intent to kill
. . . and as a result of premeditation and deliberation,
thereby implying preconsideration and determination, this is
murder in the first degree, no matter what the defendant's
"122motive may have been . . .
The second principal reason for maintaining these clari-
fications is to avoid the unprincipled and unjustified distinc-
tion between acts of "passive" and "active" euthanasia. The
Declaration on Euthanasia issued by the Vatican in 1980
states: "By euthanasia is understood an action or omission
which of itself or by intention causes death, in order that all
suffering may in this way be eliminated. Euthanasia's terms of
reference, therefore, are to be found in the intention of the
will and in the methods used."'2 3 At present, we may assume
that there is great resistance to direct forms of euthanasia
among the health care professions. However, the practice of
passive euthanasia appears easier to justify, largely because
acts of passive euthanasia can, on the surface, closely resem-
18. The precise wording, derived from a variety of sources, is sug-
gested by Rev. Robert Barry, Moral theologian: "Stay the mercy killer's hand,"
Our Sunday Visitor, Nov. 17, 1985, at 20.
19. Note, Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Con-
siderations, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1202, 1203 (1973).
20. See Russell, supra note 15, at 232.
21. Horan, supra note 6, at 209.
22. 98 N.J.L. 236, 240 (1922).
23. DECLARATION ON EUTHANASIA (1980), reprinted in PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BI-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 300, 303 (1983) (hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION).
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ble legitimate decisions to discontinue treatment or ther-
apy.24 Thus, it is critically important to emphasize that the
24. See supra notes 16-17. A recent policy "clarification" by a seven-
member panel of the American Medical Association is perhaps the clearest
evidence of medicine's willingness to accept the practice of euthanasia by
omission, while attempting to maintain a stance against active or direct
mercy-killing. "For humane reasons, with informed consent, a physician
may do what is medically necessary to alleviate severe pain, or cease or
omit treatment to permit a terminally ill patient whose death is imminent
to die. However, he should not intentionally cause death." Statement of
the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association
(March 15, 1986). The council further stated that where a terminally ill
patient is incapable of making decisions on his own behalf, treatment can
be withdrawn after consideration of the patient's prognosis, comfort, prior
expressed wishes, and the attitudes of the family of the patient. These as-
pects of the AMA policy are in essence restatements of an earlier Judicial
Council opinion, and do not on their face countenance the practice of
euthanasia.
However, two critical "clarifications" by the Council clearly raise the
prospect of euthanasia by omission under medical auspices. First is the ex-
tension of the category of patients to include situations where "death is not
imminent but a patient's coma is beyond doubt irreversible and there are
adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy of the diagnosis." Despite use
of the term "coma," it is evident that this clarification will be interpreted
to cover patients who are not technically afflicted with coma, but rather,
are in a persistent vegetative state. See Malcolm, A.M.A. Rule: Step Toward a
Social Policy on Dying, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1986, at B-7, col. 1 (referring
to patients such as Paul Brophy as in "coma", although medical testimony
in their respective cases clearly indicated that "coma" is the incorrect diag-
nostic term.)
The second clarification is the Council's pronouncement that "life pro-
longing medical treatment includes medication and artificially or technologi-
cally supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration." Accordingly, the AMA
policy would permit the removal of nutrition and hydration, a course
which is certain in all cases to result in death, from patients who are per-
manently comatose or in a persistent vegetative state. Thus, the policy
neatly fits the definition of euthanasia proposed by the authors, and sup-
ported by legal precedent and other competent authority. The impact of
this policy upon the ongoing debate over the provision of food and water
to terminally ill and profoundly incompetent patients (see infra notes 62-75
and accompanying text) remains to be seen. At least one commentator,
however, has recognized the inherent conflict between the direction of pol-
icy as embodied in the AMA statement, and the policy of law towards
handicapped persons, many of whom, it should be noted, require assistance
in feeding.
Thus, the "food and water" issue must be seen for what it is:
the entering wedge of an ethic which would permit intentional
steps to end the lives of the disabled . . . . Once intentional steps
to cause death - rather than passive measures which permit the
condition or disease to take its natural course - have been ap-
proved, the inescapable conclusion is that it is the existence of the
disabled person which constitutes the undesirable condition.
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law can no more make an exception for homicide committed
by "passive" means than it can make an exception for homi-
cide committed for compassionate motives. The result in ei-
ther case is the same: the creation of an exception to the
homicide law based on subjective factors that will not submit
to precise definition or limitation. 25
This is particularly so in the case of passive euthanasia,
since the potential targets are those who are most dependent
upon others for basic means of support. Legal doctrines
which diminish the obligation to provide these means of sup-
port, even if they do not explicitly endorse euthanasia, lead
to an erosion of the jurisprudential principles under which
passive euthanasia is prohibited. Even if it were possible to
permit these forms of passive euthanasia, while drawing a
firm line against active euthanasia, a possibility we do not ad-
mit, the likely outcome would be widespread death by neg-
lect. Under these conditions, it would be hypocritical to
maintain a prohibition against active euthanasia.
The "remedy" for certain disabilities under the functional ethic
is death. Food and water - the basic requirements of life itself -
are redefined as medical "treatments" which can be withdrawn
when the patient can no longer be made whole. Death, then, be-
comes the "final solution" for those whose disabilities make them
- to borrow a phrase - "useless eaters."
Destro, Quality-of-Life Ethics and Constitutional Jurisprudence: The Demise of
Natural Rights and Equal Protection for the Disabled and Incompetent. 2 J.
HEALTH CARE POL'Y. & L. (Forthcoming, 1986).
25. Precisely, the homicide law that is left once an exception is cre-
ated for the "hard" cases presented by the advocates of euthanasia will be
a law that is riddled with exceptions for the terminally ill, the comatose,
the vegetative, the infirm, and others requiring constant care. According
to Professor Kamisar, the appropriate response to the often-poignant cir-
cumstances of mercy-killing may be "elasticity and flexibility" in determin-
ing the degree of criminal culpability and sentence. Kamisar, supra note 1,
at 971-72. This is an appropriate course, Kamisar states, because in a mat-
ter as serious as homicide, "[tihe defendant is not always entitled to a senti-
mental acquittal." Id. at 971 (emphasis added).
Arthur Dyck notes that the merciful intentions of the proponents of eu-
thanasia do not ameliorate the foreseeable consequences of an ethic that
permits mercy-killing. "[Tihe argument for beneficent euthanasia, unlike
arguments for killing in self-defense, applies logically to a wide range of
cases, and the reasons for keeping the range of cases narrow are not rea-
sons on which people will easily agree." Dyck, Beneficent Euthanasia, in
DEATH, DYING, AND EUTHANASIA (1977).
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II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Statutory Definition of Death
Proposals to "define" death by standards other than the
traditional cessation of respiratory and circulatory functions
arose in response to the ability of medical science to artifi-
cially maintain those functions in persons who had irreversi-
bly lost the ability to do so spontaneously." The first statute
of this type was enacted in Kansas in 1970.27 At that time,
there was potential that resolution of the brain death ques-
tion would be swept into the controversy over euthanasia, by
using the concept of "brain death" to expand the traditional
concept of death to include those who are not dead, but pro-
foundly disabled.2 8 The intervention of the American Medi-
cal Association and the American Bar Association, along with
other groups, prevented such an occurrence. A joint ABA-
AMA committee produced the draft of what is now known as
the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) 2 9 The
UDDA provides a clear substitute for the jumble of "brain
death" definitions that had been enacted by statute or court
decision during the 1970's, and more importantly, prevents
misuse of the brain death standard to facilitate euthanasia.
Under the UDDA, the question of brain death is con-
fined to a matter of medical diagnosis. The UDDA permits
death to be diagnosed under neurological criteria when those
criteria establish that there has been total and permanent ces-
26. This question arose as early as 1957, when it was addressed to
Pope Pius XII by a group of anesthesiologists. The Pope responded with
an allocution, The Prolongation of Life, which has been widely quoted in le-
gal and ethical circles for its teaching on the responsibility of the physician
in the use of extraordinary means of treatment. The Pope also commented
on the question of diagnosing death, responding to the doctors' question of
whether it is proper to keep a body "alive" in the absence of brain func-
tion. "It remains for the doctor . . . to give a clear and precise definition
of 'death' and the 'moment of death' of a patient who passes away in a state
of unconsciousness." Pius XII, The Prolongation of Life, in THE POPE SPEAKS
393-98 (1958), quoted in Korein, The Problem of Brain Death: Development
and History, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 21, 28 (1978). In addition to Vol-
ume 315 of the Annals of the New York Academy, the report of the Presi-
dent's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research provides a good overview of the subject
of brain death. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH (1981)
[hereinafter cited as DEFINING DEATH].
27. 77 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 202 (Supp. 1979).
28. See infra notes 31-35.
29. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 26, at 72-73.
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sation of all functions of the brain. "An individual who has
sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all func-
tions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A
determination of death must be made in accordance with ac-
cepted medical standards.""0 Under this standard, a patient
with partial brain function, even if it is limited to the so-
called "vegetative" functions of the brain stem, cannot be de-
clared dead. This is a significant advance over some earlier
statutory approaches, which seem to leave open the possibil-
ity that such patients could be declared dead. 1 In addition, it
soundly rejects the proposal that brain death be equated with
"cortical death. '3 2 This formulation would permit a diagnosis
of death when the higher functions of the brain had been
irretrievably lost, on the theory that loss of these functions is
tantamount to loss of personhood.33 As noted by the Presi-
dent's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine, 4 the adoption of this definition "would depart
radically from the traditional standards . . . . [T]he new
standard would assign no significance to spontaneous breath-
ing or heartbeat. Indeed, it would imply that the existing
cardiopulmonary definition had been in error all along, even
before the advent of respirators and other life-sustaining
technology. 3.. Rejection of "cortical death," therefore, pre-
30. Id.
31. None of the 25 statutes passed prior to the adoption of the
UDDA specifically stated that "vegetative" patients could be declared
dead. However, such a declaration remained a possibility under those stat-
utes which did not specify that the loss of brain function must be total, and
must include the brain stem as well as the higher brain functions. ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 82-537 to -538 (Supp. 1981) ("A person is legally dead when
the brain has irreversibly ceased to function ...."); GA. CODE. ANN. § 88-
1715.1 (Supp. 1980) ("A person may be pronounced dead if it is deter-
mined that the person has suffered an irreversible cessation of brain func-
tion."); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 327C-1(b) (Supp. 1980) ("when irreversible
cessation of brain function first occurred"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202
(Supp. 1979) ("the absence of spontaneous brain function").
32. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 26, at 75.
33. Among the proponents of this position were philosophers Tris-
tram Englehardt, Jr. and Robert M. Veatch. See DEFINING DEATH, supra
note 26, at 38-39; Veatch, The Definition of Death: Ethical, Philosophical and
Policy Confusion, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sm. 307 (1978). But see D. WALTON,
ETHICS OF WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE-SUPPORT SYSTEMS 69-80 (1983) (discussion
and critique of Veatch viewpoint that diagnosis of death is permissible in
patients with persistent vegetative state).
34. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 26, at 40-41.
35. Horan, supra note 17, at 367.
19861
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
vents an obvious form of euthanasia: the redefinition of the
living as dead.
The UDDA thus thwarts an important semantical shift in
the euthanasia debate: the creation of an ill-defined category
of "brain dead" persons as candidates for euthanasia. The
UDDA does not expand the category of "dead" patients be-
yond that existing at common law. It also represents a set-
back to the opportunism which has seized upon the dilemmas
created by advancing medical technology to weaken the legal
prohibitions against euthanasia. This opportunism, however,
has been very successful in several other legislative proposals,
most notably, the concept of the "living will." Our attention
now turns in that direction.
B. "Living Will" Legislation
1985 was a decisive year for advocates of legislation rec-
ognizing the validity of "living wills:" documents which allow
a patient to direct that certain measures not be used to sus-
tain his life in the event that he becomes terminally ill and is
incapable of participating in treatment decisions. At the out-
set of 1985, less than half of the states had enacted such laws.
By the end of 1985, living will laws were on the books in
thirty-six states. 6 Also during 1985, the National Conference
36. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1980); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-
3201 to -3210 (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp.
1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1985);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113, 12-36-117(1)(s) (Supp. 1985); Liv-
ing Wills, P.A. 85-606, 1985 Conn. Legis. Serv. No. 7, at 541 (West); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2421 to -2430
(Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §765.01-.15 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 88-4101 to -4112 (Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508
(1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, §§ 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (West Supp. 1985); Life-Sustaining Pro-
cedures Act, Senate File 25, 1985 Iowa Legis. Serv. No. I at 2 (West); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28-101 to -109 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1299.58.1-
.10 (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931 (Supp.
1985); MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1985); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1985); Death Prolonging Proce-
dures Act, S.B. No. 51, 1985 Mo. Legis. Serv. No. 4, at 15 (Vernon);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -111 (Supp. 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
449.540-.690 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to H:16 (Supp.
1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-2 to -10 (Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
90-320 to -323 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (Supp.
1985); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-
101 to -110 (Supp. 1985); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon
Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1985); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 5251-5262 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE §§ 54-325.8:1 to
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of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uni-
form Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (URTIA), which is in-
tended to serve as a model to replace existing living will stat-
utes. As a result, living will laws can no longer be viewed as a
temporary legislative experiment in the field of death and dy-
ing. Whether or not the Uniform Act is enacted to replace
existing laws, the living will is now a fixture on the legislative
scene in most of our states, and is an important component in
discussing the legal status of euthanasia.3 7
In keeping with the central theme of this article, our
principal question is whether existing living will laws and the
proposed Uniform Act weaken the general legal prohibition
of euthanasia. Disclaimers to the contrary appear in the text
of virtually all living will laws, including the Uniform Act,
and in the policy statements of the advocates of the living
will. Yet, there is abundant evidence that, notwithstanding
these disclaimers, most living will laws create a legal climate
favorable to the legalization of euthanasia, and that some in-
clude legal mechanisms that would permit the practice of eu-
thanasia. The following sections of this part will examine how
living will laws impact upon some of the major issues in the
euthanasia debate: the patient's right of self-determination,
the standard of medical care towards the terminally ill, and
the practice of passive euthanasia. A final section will explore
possible alternatives to existing living will legislation.
1. Living Wills and the Right to Self-Determination
The underlying issues in living will legislation are the ob-
ligations of care-givers to treat incompetent, terminally ill pa-
tients, and the ability of persons who might eventually be-
come incapable of making treatment decisions to state, in
advance, how they prefer to be treated. Some would say that
only the second of these issues is addressed by living will laws,
:12 (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to .905 (Supp.
1985); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-
.15 (West Supp. 1985); Wvo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152 (Supp. 1985). As
this article was in final preparation, South Carolina enacted a living will
proposal. For an analysis of all enacted statutes in this area, as well as case
law, see SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE HOPE-
LESSLY ILL PATIENT (1985).
37. Contrasting views of the merits of living will legislation, and its
impact on the euthanasia debate, may be found in Gelfand, supra note 16,
at 750-53; and Martyn & Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives for the Termi-
nally Ill: The Living Will and Durable Power of Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REV. 779
(1984).
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and that these laws have no bearing on the general obligation
to provide medical treatment that is beneficial. This argu-
ment has a veneer of credibility. On their face, living will
laws appear to be simple statutory recognition of common
law rights of self-determination regarding medical treatment.
The patient is given the right to state his treatment prefer-
ences in the event that he loses capacity to decide for
himself.38
In other respects, however, the legal doctrines estab-
lished by living will legislation are quite contrary to the nor-
mal practice of medical informed consent. The living will is
unidirectional in preserving the right to consent to medical
treatment beyond the point of incompetency. With the ex-
ception of a handful of statutes, 9 living will laws do not per-
mit patients to request that treatment be provided; they only
permit patients to refuse treatment. The drafting committee
of the Uniform Law Commissioners considered and rejected
a proposal that the URTIA give patients the explicit right to
a treatment declaration requesting, as well as declining, treat-
38. Such legislation ostensibly provides an opportunity for a writ-
ten and enforceable expression of patient choice should the per-
son become incompetent during terminal illness. To justify living
will legislation upon this ground alone, however, presumes that
the physician would be liable for failure to extend heroic treat-
ment to the patient in the absence of a specific refusal by the pa-
tient. But short of abandonment, the physician is under no obliga-
tion to initiate or continue heroic or useless treatment. Indeed,
physicians customarily with familial consent discontinue or fail to
initiate such treatment without violating the ethical norms of the
community of their profession and there is as yet no reported
case, civil or criminal, in which liability has been attached for dis-
continuance of treatment for the terminally ill.
Horan & Marzen, Death With Dignity and the Living Will: A Commentary on
Legislative Development, 5 J. LEGIs. 81 (1978).
39. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3802 (1977) ("Alternatively,
every person shall have the right to request that such extraordinary means
be utilized to prolong life to the extent possible."); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-
11-10 (West Supp. 1985) (patient may request that all procedures to "ex-
tend life" be employed, and physician is bound to honor such a request).
Whatever the merits of this provision of the Arkansas law, other aspects
make this a highly flawed approach that poses a great risk of legalized eu-
thanasia. For example, there is no provision which limits application of a
decision to remove treatment to cases of terminal illness. In addition, a
binding treatment directive may be made on behalf of an incompetent per-
son. The overall lack of precision in the statute poses a great risk of abuse,
even to the extent of permitting involuntary passive euthanasia. See Horan
& Grant, Prolonging Life and Withdrawing Treatment: Legal Issues, 50
LINACRE Q. 153, 166 (1983).
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ment.4" Thus, although the URTIA professes to err on the
side of life,41 it follows the consistent pattern of other living
will laws in not permitting patients to use their living will to
personally opt for the continuation of life.
It is questionable, therefore, whether the intent of the
living will is to preserve the patient's right of self-determina-
tion, or whether the intent is to make it easier for physicians,
families and institutions to cease efforts at prolonging life.
Further basis for skepticism is provided by the suggested di-
rectives that are present in most versions of these statutes.
Although these forms vary, that contained in the URTIA is
representative:
If I should have an incurable or irreversible condition that
will cause my death within a relatively short time, and if I
am no longer able to make decisions regarding my medical
treatment, I direct my attending physician, pursuant to the
[name of statute] to withhold or withdraw treatment that
only prolongs the dying process and is not necessary to my
comfort or to alleviate pain.'
When executed at a time and place remote from the cir-
cumstances of a person's eventual terminal illness, a docu-
ment such as this is inadequate, by itself, to guide treatment
decisions. However, the URTIA invests in this document a
legal authority that is virtually absolute. The directive can:
require a physician to terminate his or her prescribed mode
40. The proposal was offered at a public session of the drafting com-
mittee that authored the Uniform Act, held in Hartford, Connecticut, in
October 1984, at which one of the authors was in attendance. The reasons
given for rejecting this proposal were that very few existing statutes in-
clude provisions allowing patients to request treatment, and that permit-
ting patients to do so would raise the possibility that patients could,
through a treatment directive, demand treatment that may be inappropri-
ate, experimental or excessively expensive. The latter risk, however, would
be more attributable to the mandatory and binding nature of the treat-
ment directive than to the provision permitting patients to request treat-
ment. If the statute gave physicians the discretion to consider whether the
course of treatment requested would be appropriate under the totality of
circumstances, there would be no question of forcing physicians to provide
treatment that was contrary to medical indications or their own profes-
sional judgment.
41. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT § 1 comment (1985)
[hereinafter cited as URTIA]. References in this article to the URTIA are
made to the typescript copy of the Act, which is available from National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 645 North Michi-
gan Ave. Suite 510, Chicago, Illinois 60611.
42. Id. § 2.
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of treatment; force an institution to transfer a patient if the
institution is unwilling to comply with the directive; provide a
basis for misdemeanor criminal charges against a physician
who wilfully fails to note a diagnosis of terminal illness for a
patient who has signed a directive, or against a physician or
health care provider which fails to comply with a directive
and also fails to transfer the patient. The only limitation on
this authority is the URTIA stipulation that it does not re-
quire "any action contrary to reasonable medical
standards."43
Each of these obligations and potential penalties arise at
any time a patient reaches the qualifying conditions of termi-
nal illness and incompetency to make treatment decisions.
This is true whether the patient be relatively young or old,
single or married, childless or a great-grandfather. Moreover,
these obligations arise regardless of the nature of the termi-
nal illness or the life-prolonging treatment involved. A
healthy person may consider any number of these potential
variables relating to a terminal illness, and nevertheless de-
cide to execute a directive. However, no one can even theo-
retically contemplate all of the factors that will be operative
when he becomes terminally ill. Apart from the limits of
human perception and imagination, there is the fact that ad-
vances and changes in medical science and options for care
may render today's contemplation of terminal illness totally
irrelevant." The vision of prolonged death in an intensive
care environment may, for example, be rendered obsolete by
advances in hospice care and pain control. The experience of
the hospice movement, in fact, offers conclusive evidence
that the attitudes of dying patients towards medical treatment
can change dramatically depending upon the setting of that
43. Section 9 of the URTIA provides that the wilful failure to com-
ply with the terms of a living will is a misdemeanor, and section 10(f) con-
tains the "medical standards" exceptions.
44. The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine has criticized the binding nature of living will directives, stating
that they do not "provide self-determination in the sense of active moral
agency by the patient on his or her own behalf." REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 23, at 137.
Hence, a decision not to follow an advance directive may some-
times be justified even when it would not be acceptable to disre-
gard a competent patient's contemporaneous choice. Such a deci-
sion would most often rest on a finding that the patient did not
adequately envision and consider the particular situation within
which the actual medical decision must be made.
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treatment and the quality of support for the individual pa-
tient.4 5 Moreover, those who execute living wills while
healthy may change their minds at a later time. If they have
neglected to revoke their living will, this now-antiquated di-
rective would retain the force of law. Care providers who
would ignore the directive under such circumstances risk sig-
nificant liability.
The URTIA, like other living will proposals, fails to ade-
quately protect the "rights" of the terminally ill, even the ba-
sic right of self-determination regarding medical treatment.
The deficiencies of the living will were noted by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy, where the court held
that persons have a common-law right to make advance treat-
ment directives which will govern in the event that they are
terminally ill, incompetent, and confined to a nursing home.
The court held that where such a directive, given in advance,
states a general desire not to have life "prolonged" by "artifi-
cial" measures, it does not constitute clear and convincing ev-
idence that will permit the withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment.4 Conroy provides a useful point of departure for future
legislative initiatives on this subject matter. In order to be le-
gally binding, evidence of a patient's decisions regarding
treatment should be far more specific, both as to the nature
of the treatment that may be withdrawn, and as to the level
of physical impairment that a patient would consider accept-
45. An extensive literature attests to the success of the hospice phi-
losophy in meeting the needs of terminally ill patients. See R. BUCKINGHAM,
THE COMPLETE HOSPICE GUIDE (1983); E. KOBLER-Ross, QUESTIONS AND AN-
SWERS ON DEATH AND DYING (1974); E. KOBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING
(1969); R. LAMERTON, CARE OF THE DYING (1973); A. MUNLEY, THE HOSPICE
ALTERNATIVE: A NEW CONTEXT FOR DEATH AND DYING (1983). It is signifi-
cant that those involved in hospice care tend to be vigorously opposed to
euthanasia, while at the same time opposing the use of invasive, technologi-
cal procedures upon patients in the final stage of terminal illness. "As far
as the hospice is concerned, legalization of euthanasia would be nothing
more than a cheap, expedient solution to be problem of terminal care at
the expense of the patient's best welfare." A. MUNLEY, supra, at 274-75.
Precisely because of its proven ability to promote the patient's welfare,
while resolving the societal problem of inadequate care for the terminally
ill, "the hospice movement can be a powerful force for undercutting a
movement for active euthanasia." Id. at 275. Despite the rather volatile
environment of the American health care industry, the hospice movement
has successfully adapted to the economic pressures without compromising
its original ideals. Tehan, Has Success Spoiled Hospice?, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Oct. 1985, at 10.
46. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 n.7 (1985).
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able. 4 7 In their current form, living will laws provide legal
protection for physicians and others to remove life-prolong-
ing treatments, but they provide scant protection for the
right to make a genuinely informed decision regarding
treatment.
2. Living Wills and Standards of Patient Care
Current forms of the living will clearly skew the decision
of patients in the direction of refusing medical treatment.
Advocates of the living will state that this is necessary to pro-
tect the patient's "right to die" without unwanted medical in-
tervention. Enactment of the living will, therefore, would ap-
pear to establish a public policy in favor of medical decisions
that honor the "right to die." It is questionable, in the cur-
rent environment of health care, whether this public policy
will be a benefit to society.
The traditional ethics of medical practice, in which a re-
lationship of physician-patient trust was premised on the as-
sumption that the physician would always advance the pa-
tient's interests first, have been shaken. The drive towards
cost containment and the expansion of the for-profit sector in
the health care market already ensures that interests other
than those of the patient are taken into account in making
many treatment decisions."' Perhaps we have not yet reached
a point where these ancillary interests are decisive; we have
clearly reached a point where they are influential. Dr. Mark
Siegler and Alan Weisbard have acutely observed the inter-
section between these economic factors and the "right to
die" philosophy that lies at the heart of living will legislation.
[Flor an increasing number of patients, the benefits of con-
tinued life are perceived as insufficient to justify the burden
and cost of care; . . . death is the desired outcome, and
. . . the role of the physician is to participate in bringing
this about. . . . [Clost containment strategies may impose
significant financial penalties on those who provide pro-
longed care for the impaired elderly. In the current envi-
47. See discussion of standards created by Conroy, infra notes 131-40
and accompanying text.
48. For an overview of the impact of cost-containment on the tradi-
tional ethics of medical practice, see Cassel, Deciding to Forego Life-Sus-
taining Treatment: Implications for Policy in 1985, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 287
(1985); Siegler & Weisbard, Against the Emerging Stream-Should Fluids and
Nutritional Support Be Discontinued? 145 ARCHIvES INTERNAL MED. 129
(1985).
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ronment, it may well prove convenient-and all too
easy-to move from recognition of an individual's "right to
die" (to us, an unfortunate phrasing in the first place) to a
climate enforcing a "duty to die.""'
Other researchers have documented that the fears of Sie-
gler and Weisbard are not idle. Dr. Christine Cassell reports
that some policy planners have suggested that Medicare pa-
tients be provided living wills upon admission to the hospi-
tal-not for the purpose of securing a course of treatment
that is appropriate from the patient's standpoint, but in the
interests of cost containment."0 Paul Starr, in The Social
Transformation of American Medicine, provides evidence that
pressure upon individual physicians to generate income will
lead to discrimination in care based on the level of private
insurance, if any, carried by the patient.51 Cassell observes
how the convergence of such forces alters the ethics of medi-
cal practice:
As long as a decision about life-sustaining therapy is
made in the moral intimacy of the physician-patient rela-
tionship, the physician wanted to engage in the struggle of
conscience privately, weighing the values of patient, and
family, and her own. But now she is being asked to let pa-
tients die because they cost too much, or to obfuscate, be-
cause we face the problem of allocation of scarce medical
resources. . . . [Physicians] are expected to be the new
gatekeepers of society's wealth.
* Bolstered by the rhetoric of compassion, common
sense, and death with dignity, we will see a new practice,
which can ominously be called "kill the dying."'..
In such an atmosphere, living will legislation is likely to
cause further erosion in the medical profession's ethos of pre-
serving life, and in the barriers that have heretofore pre-
vented serious public consideration of legalized mercy-killing.
This erosion starts with acceptance of the subtle but powerful
assumption that the alleged over-treatment of terminally ill
and profoundly impaired patients is inimical to the interests
of such patients, as well as to the interests of the medical pro-
49. Siegler & Weisbard, supra note 48, at 131.
50. Cassel, supra note 48, at 293.
51. P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF. AMERICAN MEDICINE
436-47 (1982).
52. Cassel, supra note 48, at 289, 293-94.
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fession and of society at large. When the "over-treatment"
thesis is more closely analyzed, it is apparent that even rela-
tively simple measures, such as the provision of food and
fluids, are part of the alleged problem. This is because the
"over-treatment" thesis does not focus solely on the quality
of, or medical indications for, the treatment in question.
Rather, the thesis is closely tied to the assumption that the
patient's "quality of life" is also a determinative factor in
treatment decisions. With acceptance of the "over-treat-
ment" thesis, death of the patient emerges as a favored out-
come in a significant number of cases where quality of life is
perceived to be low, and the major ethical problem is what
boundaries, if any, to place in the way of hastening death.
Living will legislation, because it is founded on the over-treat-
ment thesis, thus represents a more important shift in public
policy towards medical practice than is commonly recognized.
As seen by the recent experience of California, where legisla-
tion to amend that State's Natural Death Act (living will)
would permit the administration of direct means of killing to
certain terminally ill patients, the alteration of public policy
by passage of the living will will make future proposals for
more direct forms of euthanasia more palatable."
Thus, by altering their legislative agenda away from the
volatile question of direct euthanasia to the more subtle
agenda of the living will, groups such as the Society for the
Right to Die and Concern for Dying have achieved a great
deal in lowering legal and social constraints on euthanasia."'
For the first three decades of its organized existence, the
euthanasia movement met with little success in the political
or legal arenas. The legislative agenda of permitting active
euthanasia of the terminally ill was stalled in part because the
difficulties of illness were a personal and medical problem,
most often confronted in a family context."5 Today, these
problems are social and economic, and although they are still
confronted by doctors, nurses, hospitals and families, the so-
lutions are purported to have a social and economic impact.
In recent years, social issues, such as euthanasia, have often
been given to the health care professions to solve by medical
means. In this case, the social issue of care for the aging and
dying has become medicalized, and the medical issue of the
53. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 4 for a discussion of "right to die" organizations in
the United States and abroad.
55. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 23, at 16.
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proper scope of treatment has become socialized.
The euthanasia movement has successfully seized upon
the opportunity presented by this climate to press for accept-
ance of the living will. The movement's success is not only
political, for it has also fostered, greater acceptance in medi-
cal practice of the attitude towards death as a desired out-
come. Such legislation also provides a measure of comfort to
physicians who are understandably concerned about growing
legal liabilities. On the personal side, living will laws provide
an outlet for the human yearning for an easy and comforta-
ble death in lieu of a prolonged dying.
While it is easy to support the goal of reduced human
suffering, we should not be deterred from a rigorous exami-
nation of the public policy proposals that are advanced in the
cause of euthanasia. The goal of preventing prolonged, pain-
ful death is difficult to oppose, but the translation of this goal
into specific legislation creates the risk of compromising
other interests that are even more fundamental to our socie-
tal notions of justice. As Professor Kamisar has noted, the
price of maintaining the rights of all citizens against the ethic
of mercy-killing may include the temporary continuation of
life for certain individuals who would rather die.5" This is a
difficult proposition to defend in contemporary society, but as
Kamisar noted, virtually all of our most cherished liber-
ties-including freedom of the press and freedom of reli-
gion-require the tolerance of conditions that are perceived
to be obnoxious. The process of dying can be the most diffi-
cult of human conditions to tolerate-not only for the dying
person, but also for those who are responsible for that per-
son's care. The danger, therefore, is that this second cate-
gory of persons, representing society as a whole, will cease to
tolerate the difficulties of this care, and turn to the practice
of mercy-killing as a solution. Over-eager acceptance of pub-
lic policies which favor the death of patients will enlarge this
danger, because the magnitude and breadth of human suffer-
ing will continually expand the population of those for whom
death is seen as a desired outcome.
3. Living Wills and the Practice of Passive Euthanasia
Most living will statutes disclaim any intent to legalize or
otherwise endorse the practice of euthanasia.5 7 The dis-
56. Kamisar, supra note 1, at 1041-42.
57. Approximately 27 of the existing living will statutes contain such
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claimer in the URTIA is representative: "This Act does not
condone, authorize or approve mercy-killing or euthana-
sia." 8 Significantly, the model living will law drafted in 1978
at a conference sponsored by the Society for the Right to Die
contains no such disclaimer.59 None of the enacted statutes
define what is meant by "euthanasia" or "mercy-killing," and
none create any new prohibitions or penalties upon the prac-
tice of euthanasia. Therefore, the euthanasia disclaimers,
which are evidently included in living will legislation to allevi-
ate political controversy, do little or nothing to stem the ero-
sion in legal prohibitions against euthanasia.
Indeed, certain mechanisms of the living will statutes ap-
pear on their face to undermine these prohibitions. The first
of these mechanisms is the immunity granted to physicians
for decisions to withdraw treatment from a "qualified," usu-
ally meaning terminally ill,60 patient who has executed a liv-
ing will. The purpose of the immunity provision is under-
standable. Absent immunity, prudent physicians may be
reluctant to rely upon the living will as adequate proof of the
patient's consent to withdrawal of the particular treatment in
question. In addition, the public policy advanced by such leg-
islation is to encourage acceptance of the "right to die" by
physicians and the public.6" If physicians are immune to legal
penalties for activity which protects this "right," this policy
will be served.
It is questionable, however, whether accomplishment of
these purposes outweighs the significant negative conse-
quences of granting blanket immunity to decisions made
under a living will. The threat of civil or criminal liability for
improper withdrawals of medical treatment is an appropriate
reinforcement of the standards of medical ethics, particularly
concerning vulnerable patients who are no longer able to de-
fend their own interests.62 Given the open-ended nature of
the treatment directive in most living will legislation, physi-
cians should be encouraged to proceed cautiously when a liv-
ing will is to be given effect. Although the statute and the
form declarations lump together all ','life-prolonging proce-
clauses. Those that do not include Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Idaho, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Vermont. For citations of
statutes, see supra note 36.
58. URTIA, supra note 41, § 10(g).
59. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 23, at 313-17.
60. See, e.g., URTIA, supra note 41, § 1(7).
61. See Gelfand, supra note 16, at 750-51.
62. See Kamisar, supra note 1, at 971-77.
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dures" as if they were one category of treatment,6 3 the physi-
cian should be permitted and even obligated to exercise his
professional judgment and expertise to examine each form of
treatment being provided to a patient, and to decide whether
withdrawal of that treatment is ethically and legally appropri-
ate.64 It is reasonable to assume that in practice, most physi-
cians will continue to work in this fashion, and thus prevent
abuse of the living will. However, the immunity granted by
these statutes leaves open another possibility: that treatment
will be summarily withdrawn from terminally ill, incompetent
patients at an arbitrary point. An alternative to blanket im-
munity should be devised so that the practice of honoring a
patient's request not to have life needlessly prolonged in the
final stages of terminal illness does not become a pretext for
abandonment of such patients.
A second aspect of living will legislation which may per-
mit the practice of euthanasia is the failure of such legislation
to adequately define the forms of treatment that may be
withdrawn from patients, and the circumstances under which
withdrawal can take place. The type of treatment that can be
withdrawn under the URTIA, called "life-sustaining treat-
ment," is defined as "any medical procedure or intervention
that, when administered to a qualified patient, will serve only
to prolong the process of dying."6 A "qualified patient" is a
patient over 18 "who has executed a declaration and has
been determined by the attending physician to be in a termi-
nal condition."66 A "terminal condition" is an incurable or
irreversible condition that, "without the administration of
life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of the attending
physician, result in death within a relatively short time." 76 7
Taken together, these terms define the circumstances under
which a withdrawal of treatment that may result in death can
be made under the URTIA.
The definitions are purposefully broad, and thus leave
significant ambiguity, for example, on the question of what
specific types of treatment may be withdrawn. According to
63. There is a trend in recent enactments to differentiate between
the provision of nutrition and hydration, and medicines required for pain
control on the one hand, and all remaining forms of life-sustaining therapy
on the other. See infra note 69.
64. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 23, at
137.
65. URTIA, supra note 41, § 1(4).
66. Id. § 1(7).
67. Id. § 1(9).
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the comments of the committee that drafted the URTIA,
treatments such as renal dialysis and insulin therapy are not
included in the category of treatments that can be with-
drawn. The committee supported this finding by the curious
and medically inaccurate statement that renal failure and dia-
betes, because they can be effectively managed, are not "irre-
versible" conditions.6 8
The committee failed to extend this logic, however, to
the provision of nutrition and hydration. The need for
mechanical assistance in providing nutrition and hydration
can arise from many sources, just as the need for dialysis or
insulin therapy. In all these cases, however, there is an under-
lying, vital need that is being met. Neither the text of the
URTIA, nor the comments of its drafters, explain the differ-
ent treatment which the URTIA gives to dialysis and insulin
on the one hand, and nutrition and hydration on the other.
Eschewing the approach of the many states which have spe-
cifically excluded nutrition in the category of life-sustaining
treatment that can be withdrawn pursuant to a living will, 9
the URTIA sides with those statutes which contain no such
exclusion and thus, by implication, permit the withdrawal of
these measures under their living will. 70 Since provision of
68. Id. § 1 comment.
69. The following states expressly provide that nutrition and hydra-
tion are excluded from the category of life-sustaining treatments that may
be withdrawn from a patient: Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. In Montana,
nutrition and hydration is excluded where the provision of nutrition and
hydration is required for patient comfort. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(2)
(Supp. 1985). Thus, the exclusion might not apply where a patient is "be-
yond comfort," i.e., in a persistent coma. In Tennessee, there is no defini-
tion of "life-sustaining procedures," but the definition of "medical care"
specifically includes "artificial or forced feeding." TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-
11-103(5) (Supp. 1985). However, the act also states that "in no case shall
[medical care] be interpreted to allow the withholding of simple nourish-
ment or fluids so as to condone death by starvation or dehydration." Id. It
is significant that sixteen of the twenty living will laws passed in 1984 and
1985 contain some distinction between nutrition and hydration, and medi-
cal treatment.
70. The URTIA's specific language on this point is as follows: "This
[Act] does not affect the responsibility of the attending physician or other
health-care provider to provide treatment, including nutrition and hydra-
tion, for a patient's comfort care or alleviation of pain." URTIA, supra
note 41, § 6(b). The comments to this provision indicate that the Commis-
sioners did not understand the full reasons for excluding the provision of
nutrition and hydration from the category of life-sustaining procedures
subject to advance treatment directives.
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nutrition by naso-gastric tube, gastrostomy or jujenostomy
If nutrition and hydration are not necessary for comfort care or
the alleviation of pain, they may be withdrawn. This approach was
deemed preferable to the approach in a few existing statutes,
which treat nutrition and hydration as comfort care in all cases,
regardless of circumstances, and exclude comfort from the life-
sustaining treatment definition.
Id. § 6 comment. The Commissioner's misunderstanding of this issue re-
sults in part from a misconstruing of those statutes which exclude nutrition
and hydration. See supra note 69. These statutes do not define nutrition
and hydration as an aspect of comfort care; rather, they exclude both nutri-
tion/hydration and comfort care from the category of treatments that may
be withdrawn under the Act. The provision in the Life Prolonging Proce-
dures Act of Florida is an example: "'Life prolonging procedure'" shall
not include the provision of sustenance or the administration of medication
or the performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide
comfort care or alleviate pain." FLA. STAT. § 765.03(3) (1984). Careful
reading of this provision reveals that the modifier "deemed necessary to
provide comfort care or alleviate pain" does not apply to the first two ante-
cedents (sustenance and medication), but rather, to the last antecedent,
"the performance of any medical procedure." The doctrine of statutory
construction known as reddendo singula singulis holds that each phrase in a
statute is to be applied to its appropriate object. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1148 (5th ed. 1979); 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 47.26 (4th ed. 1984). In this case, the final clause of the provision is
clearly intended to sweep in a broad category of treatments that may be
requisite for patient comfort. However, if the legislature intended to ex-
clude nutrition and hydration only to the extent that they provide comfort
care, the prior "sustenance" clause would be redundant, for nutrition and
hydration in such cases would be included as "any medical procedure
deemed necessary to provide comfort care or alleviate pain."
The existing statutes referred to by the Commissioners, therefore, do
not equate nutrition with comfort care, but rather, consider the provision
of nutrition and hydration an element of basic care that ought to be pro-
vided notwithstanding the dictates of an advance treatment directive. The
rationale for this distinction was expressed by Judge David Kopelman of
the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court in Norfolk County, where he
ruled that a gastrostomy feeding tube could not be removed from a 45-
year-old man in a persistent vegetative state. Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp. Inc., No. 85E0009-G1 (Mass. Probate Ct., Norfolk, Oct. 21, 1985)
rev'd in relevant part, No. 4152 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Sept. 11, 1986). "It is
ethically inappropriate to cause the preventable death of Brophy by the
deliberate denial of food and water, which can be provided to him in a
noninvasive, nonintrusive manner which causes no pain and suffering, irre-
spective of the substituted judgment of the patient." Slip. op. at 23. Judge
Kopelman contrasted the feeding tube to other forms of life-sustaining
therapy, such as mechanical respirators, cardio-pulmonary resuscitation,
and aggressive antibiotic therapy, and found that the continuation of feed-
ing is far less invasive, intrusive and risky than any of these measures. Id.
This distinction was rejected on appeal by the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court, which held in a 4-3 ruling that the patient's substituted judg-
ment could be exercised by his family to withdraw the gastrostomy tube.
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"reverses" the life-threatening inability to ingest food just as
certainly as dialysis "reverses" life-threatening renal block-
age, the statute's resolution of this issue is unsatisfactory.
Moreover, the URTIA's reliance on existing statutes which
contain no exclusion may be misplaced, since the medico-le-
gal controversy over withdrawal of nutrition and hydration
did not arise until after many of these statutes were
enacted.7 1
Compounding the error is the statute's failure to per-
ceive the special significance of nutrition and hydration as a
"life-prolonging" measure. The difference between those
statutes which omit nutrition and hydration from the opera-
tion of living wills and those statutes which do not is a very
serious disagreement on policy. A substantial body of legal
and ethical opinion considers the routine withdrawal of these
elements to be euthanasia; other authorities, while not going
this far, believe that withdrawal of food and water is a more
serious matter than other decisions to terminate treatment.
The URTIA professes to defer to medical decision-making
opinion in this matter, but current opinion appears to be
greatly divided on this question. 3 Since the questions of
when withdrawal of nourishment and hydration is appropri-
ate, and when such withdrawal constitutes euthanasia, are
very open, the URTIA's decision to treat nutrition and hy-
dration as a form of treatment that can ordinarily be with-
drawn pursuant to a living will is difficult to reconcile with
71. The subject of nutrition and hydration has received a great deal
of attention in journals of medical ethics and other forums only within the
past five years. See, e.g., Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always be Given
Food and Water? HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 17; Micetich, Are
Intravenous Fluids Morally Required for a Dying Patient?, 143 ARCHIVES IN-
TERNAL MED. 975 (1983). But see Siegler & Weisbard, supra note 48. Not
coincidentally, provisions which exclude nutrition and hydration from the
definition of life-sustaining treatment appear predominantly in statutes that
have been passed since 1983. Living Wills, P.A. 85-606, 1985 Conn. Legis.
Serv. No. 7, at 541 (West); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(3) (Supp. 1985); GA.
CODE ANN. § 88-4102(5) (Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 702 (C)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-4 (West Supp. 1985);
Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, 1985 Iowa Legis. Serv. No. 1, at 2 (West);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2921.4 (Supp. 1985); Death Prolonging Pro-
cedures Act, S.B. No. 51, 1985 Mo. Legis. Serv. No. 4, at 15 (Vernon);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5) (Supp. 1985).
72. See Horan & Grant, The Legal Aspects of Withdrawing Nourishment,
5 J. LEGAL MED. 595, 622-631 (1984), and discussion of Brophy case in note
70, supra.
73. See supra note 71. See also Note, I.V. Withdrawal: The Severence of
Medicine's or Society's Umbilical Cord?, 63 NEB. L. REV. 941 (1984).
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the URTIA's professed intention "to err on the side of pre-
serving life."'74
In addition to dangerous ambiguity on the question of
the types of treatment that may be withdrawn from a patient,
the URTIA is plagued by its definition of "qualified patients"
from whom treatment can be withdrawn. Under the URTIA,
physician discretion determines whether a particular treat-
ment serves solely "to prolong the dying process." The scope
of the "dying process," however, is a highly subjective deter-
mination. In the case of certain chronic ailments, such as
Alzheimer's disease, the difficulty of caring for patients may
exert subtle pressure to enlarge the temporal scope of the
"dying process. '75 Several statutes avert this danger by pro-
viding that treatment can be withdrawn only if the patient
will die, regardless of whether the treatment is administered
or not.7 ' Thus, the only form of treatment that must be with-
drawn under these living will statutes is truly futile treatment;
treatment that is postponing a death that is both certain and
inevitable.
Critics of this cautious approach to death legislation
maintain that such provisions unduly restrict application of
the living will. The alternative they propose, however,
raises other dangers. Under the URTIA, for example, the
only medical requisite for operation of a living will is the
presence of an irreversible or incurable life-threatening con-
dition.78 Any medical intervention which prolongs the life of a
patient in such a situation may be withdrawn. The URTIA
has thus confused two situations with consequences that are
potentially quite different: the treatment of patients in the fi-
nal stage of terminal illness, and the care of patients who are
74. URTIA, supra note 41, § 1 comment.
75. Evidence of this direction is provided in guidelines developed at a
conference of physicians sponsored by the Society for the Right to Die.
Wanzer & Adelstein, The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Pa-
tients, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 955 (1984). An associate clinical professor of
medicine at the University of Southern California has suggested the formu-
lation of an "Alzheimer's Amendment" to existing living will laws to pro-
vide that when a patient with Alzheimer's disease reaches the point of de-
mentia that spoon feeding becomes necessary, "it could be requested and
written that no type of feeding be given." Marmorstein, Could the New
Jersey Decision Apply to Alzheimer's?, Medical Tribune, March 27, 1985, at
38.
76. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(l) (West Supp.
1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(8) (West Supp. 1985).
77. URTIA, supra note 41, § 1 comment.
78. Id. § 1(7).
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greatly impaired, but nevertheless, could not be considered
to be dying. Karen Quinlan might serve as an example of
such a case. The withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from
patients in this second category involves legal and ethical con-
siderations that are quite different from a decision to forego
futile life-sustaining treatment in a truly terminal case." ' A
decision to forego treatment when life can be prolonged for
an indefinite period of time is not necessarily based on a
judgment that further treatment is futile or overly burden-
some, but may be based on a judgment that the life in ques-
tion is no longer worth preserving. As at least two courts
have recognized, such a decision may be tantamount to eu-
thanasia.80 To the extent that the URTIA will encourage
such decisions to be made, it will have lowered a significant
barrier to the practice of euthanasia.
It is evident that the benefits that flow from living will
legislation do not outweigh these significant deficits, and
thus, do not justify the promulgation of a "uniform" living
will law at this time. The principal intended benefit is to pro-
tect the rights of incompetent patients who do not wish their
lives prolonged by medical treatment. A secondary benefit is
to assist physicians in making difficult decisions to terminate
treatment. Knowledge that a particular course of action "is
79. Paul Ramsey, in commenting upon the California Natural Death
Act, stresses the importance of the stringent definition of terminal condi-
tion to apply only to those patients whose death is imminent "regardless of
the application of life-sustaining procedures." P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE
EDGES OF LIFE 325-26 (1978). Ramsey suggests that, in the context of the
California statute, this requirement "may say too much." Id. at 327. How-
ever, the URTIA differs from the California act in its definition of termi-
nal condition, which is a salient component of Ramsey's analysis. Whereas
removal of treatment under the California act "is anchored in a physician's
reasonable certainty of the objective fact that death is imminent," Id., the
URTIA specifically rejected "imminency" language and, instead, defined a
terminal condition as one which will bring about death within a "relatively
shoirt time." URTIA, supra note 41, § 1(9), § 1 comment. This term is
sufficiently ambiguous so as to potentially enlarge the category of patients
well beyond that embraced in the California act.
80. The opinion of the Appellate Division in Conroy, which was later
reversed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, held that removal of a feeding
tube from a non-comatose patient whose death was not imminent would
constitute euthanasia. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 475-76, 464 A.2d
303, 315 (1983), rev'd, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). The trial court
in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., No. 85E0009-GI (Mass. Pro-
bate Ct., Norfolk, Oct. 21, 1985) rev'd in relevant part, No. 4152 (Mass.
Sup. Jud. Ct. Sept. 11, 1986), held that removal of a feeding tube from a
non-dying patient in a persistent vegetative state would be unethical and
contrary to public policy against euthanasia. Slip. op. at 42.
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what the patient would have wanted" may mean more to the
physician and nursing staff than any form of legal immunity
granted by the living will statute. These benefits accrue, how-
ever, only if the. patient has signed a living will. Even in such
cases,. the non-specific nature of the living will with regard to
particular treatments may render the document almost use-
less as an instrument of patient autonomy. In sum, the bene-
fits provided by current living will legislation to medical deci-
sion-making could be securely obtained through
improvements in patient-physician communication, modifica-
tion of hospital policies towards care of the chronically and
terminally ill, and legislation which provides a more balanced
approach to the problems of such patients, alternatives which
do not weaken existing legal strictures against euthanasia.8"
4. Legislative Alternatives to the Living Will
Despite the shortcomings of the URTIA and other living
will legislation, there is a place for legislation on the medical
treatment of the terminally ill. As courts have recognized,
the legislature is a more appropriate forum for the compet-
ing claims of private rights and public interests that are at
issue.82 The legislature ought to be encouraged to take this
role seriously, and consider a variety of approaches to protect
the rights and interests of patients, and to clarify the legal
status of euthanasia. In addition, the legislature maintains an
inherent capacity for self-correction that is not as evident in
the judiciary. Finally, as discussed in the next section of this
article, court decisions in many ways pose a greater threat to
existing prohibitions on euthanasia than does living will legis-
lation. As theologian Paul Ramsey has noted, "(l)egislation is
our last resort if I am correct in believing that the common
law's ancient protection of life-against any private decision
makers and against any consensus-is eroding. "83
It is beyond the scope of this article to propose compre-
81. The President's Commission concluded that the "greatest value"
of living will legislation was the impetus it provided to patient-physician
communication. "This educational effect might be obtained, however,
without making the documents binding by statute and without enforce-
ment and punishment provisions." REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION,
supra note 23, at 145. Adoption of this recommendation of the Commis-
sion would satisfy most of the arguments presented in this article against
living will statutes.
82. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So.
2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
83. P. RAMSEY, supra note 79, at 330.
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hensive legislative reform in the area of medical treatment of
the terminally ill and chronically impaired. We use the term
"reform" with some caution, because what is needed is a
comprehensive strengthening of existing legal rights and ob-
ligations. The medico-legal challenge in this debate is not, as
is so often said, to overcome the failure of the law to keep
pace with medical technology. The challenge is to prevent
the dilemmas of medical decision-making from forcing upon
us undesirable changes in the law. None of these dilemmas
are so difficult or so foreign to traditional medical ethics that
they confound existing legal doctrines." Yet, for various rea-
sons, these doctrines are considered obsolete, and doctrines
which provide a legal basis-for euthanasia are being erected
in their place."5
Legislation will inevitably be needed to halt this ill-
founded legal reform. We suggest the following categories
for legislative activity. Some are discrete statutory schemes;
others may be accomplished by amendment of existing
statutes.
a. Protection of Vulnerable Adults
One area of social change which has been inadequately
addressed by legislation is the phenomenon of elderly, im-
paired patients, lacking frequent family contact, who reside
in nursing homes. This is a problem that did not exist in its
current proportions a generation ago, and one that will ex-
pand by the turn of the century and beyond. Such persons
are vulnerable medically because they are seen by physicians
infrequently, vulnerable socially because they are cut off
from a family environment and other stimuli, and vulnerable
politically because they have no capacity of their own to influ-
ence the many governmental decisions which affect their
lives.
Although legislation to reform the nursing home indus-
try is helpful, our proposal is that states go further to estab-
lish offices for the protection of individual nursing home pa-
tients, and other vulnerable adults. The Minnesota
Vulnerable Adults Protection Act"6 might be considered as a
model of such legislation. Under this legislation, private com-
plainants may initiate an investigation of suspected abuse of
84. See Horan & Grant, supra note 39.
85. P. RAMSEY, supra note 79, at 294-95.
86. MINN. STAT. .ANN. § 626.557 (West 1983).
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adults.8 7 Such procedures may be effective ways of deterring
medical abuse without resort to adversarial proceedings. A
similar approach has been enacted by Congress with respect
to the medical treatment of handicapped infants. An alterna-
tive to the Minnesota legislation is that highlighted by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in its Conroy opinion: an office of
ombudsman for the institutionalized elderly. Under Conroy,
the office of ombudsman, created by statute several years ear-
lier, was granted a new authority: to investigate and file a re-
port in cases where life-prolonging medical treatment is
sought to be withdrawn from terminally ill nursing home
patients. 88
Conceivably, such legislation could be used not only to
reinforce legal protection for the elderly, but to investigate,
and deter, true instances of over-treatment of the elderly. If
a patient's bodily integrity or dignity were being violated by
overly aggressive medical treatment, an appropriate com-
plaint could be filed with an ombudsman, who would then
investigate and make recommendations. Contested cases
could be resolved in court, or through an "ethics committee"
mechanism similar to that recommended for infant treatment
controversies. 89
b. Establish Minimal Care Guidelines
A legitimate concern raised by the URTIA is that it pro-
vides no basic level of care that must be provided to patients
in all circumstances. With the advent of the debate over
whether nutrition and hydration are required in all cases,
there is little consensus on this issue. Yet, the lack of consen-
sus should not stay the legislature's hand; a similar circum-
stance prevailed on the issue of treatment for handicapped
infants and was resolved largely as a result of the public inter-
est stirred by the case of Infant Doe in Bloomington,
Indiana.90
The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, 9' pertaining to
the Infant Doe issue, offer guidance for creating a base stan-
87. Id. § 626.557 Subd. 3.
88. 98 N.J. at 378-85, 486 A.2d at 1239-42.
89. See Services and Treatment for Disabled Infants; Model Guide-
lines for Health Care Providers to Establish Infant Care Review Commit-
tees, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,893 (1985).
90. See Horan & Balch, Infant Doe and Baby Jane Doe: Medical Treat-
ment of the Handicapped Newborn, 52 LINACRE Q. 45, 50 (1985).
91. Supra note 8.
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dard of medical care. Under these amendments, beneficial
medical treatment must be provided to any infant unless 1)
the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; 2) the pro-
vision of such treatment would merely prolong dying or be
otherwise futile in terms of survival; and 3) the provision of
treatment would be futile and the treatment itself would be
inhumane under the circumstances. 92 Even under these ex-
ceptions, however, a patient cannot be denied "appropriate
nutrition, hydration and medication."93 This standard pro-
vides a workable foundation for a proper standard of care
towards terminally ill adults.
The law currently recognizes that medical treatment
need not be provided to patients who meet any of the three
categories of exceptions.94 There is growing ambiguity, how-
ever, regarding the obligation to provide appropriate nutri-
tion, hydration and medication.9" Enactment of such a base-
line standard need not create an absolute requirement to pro-
vide nourishment, by whatever method, to every patient.
There are narrowly prescribed circumstances where the
means of providing nutrition and hydration are not medically
appropriate." In order to draw the line against euthanasia by
starvation, the law should insist that any decision to forego
nutrition and hydration be strictly justifiable by medical crite-
ria: impossibility, imminent death which makes surgical inter-
vention inappropriate, futility due to inability to metabolize
or otherwise benefit from nutrition. 97 In addition to appro-
priate nutrition and medication, such legislation ought to
mandate other measures needed for the comfort and per-
sonal dignity of patients: personal hygiene care, turning to
prevent bedsores, adequate warmth.
92. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2) (1985).
93. Id.
94. See generally Horan & Grant, supra note 39.
95. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
96. "We recognize that in rare cases, the provision of fluids and, par-
ticularly, nutritional support may be medically futile or even counter-
productive in sustaining life. We do not recommend that such futile or
counterproductive steps be mandated." Siegler & Weisbard, supra note 48,
at 130.
97. This is virtually identical to the standard enunciated by the trial
court in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp. Inc., No. 85E0009-G1 (Mass.
Probate Ct., Norfolk, Oct. 21, 1985), rev'd in relevant part, No. 4152 (Mass.
Sup. Jud. Ct. Sept. '11, 1986).
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c. Protect the Right to Consent to Treatment
The right of an adult to express, while competent, his
preferences for medical treatment in event of incompetency
and terminal illness is secured by the common law98 and, pos-
sibly, by the constitutions of the states and the federal gov-
ernment.99 The central premise of living will legislation,
therefore, is in some respects a restatement of existing law.
However, living will legislation inadequately protects the
rights of patients in this area. These rights must include the
right to request all appropriate medical interventions, as well
as the right to refuse treatment. Thus, legislation and sug-
gested directives should provide a broader range of options
to prospective signers of the living will than presently exists.
Moreover, patients should be protected against the unfore-
seen consequences of a living will that is signed without
knowledge of the nature of the medical condition and treat-
ment in question. A patient's directives should not be cava-
lierly ignored, but neither should they be used to bring about
the suspension of all treatment where the directive was made
without knowledge of the present condition. Several states
have made living will documents advisory to physicians,
which seems to be a preferable approach.0 0 A physician
should be granted immunity only for good-faith, medically
appropriate decisions made under the aegis of such a docu-
ment. Even greater reliance, of course, can be placed on the
directive of a patient who, at the time of executing a direc-
tive, had knowledge of the nature of his condition and of
treatment alternatives.
There are clearly other areas in which legislation could
be beneficial, many of which will become apparent after
greater experience. We hope the preceding discussion has es-
tablished that there are legislative mechanisms available to
provide a greater balance than that present in the current
scheme of living will legislation. The existing statutes may
eventually be seen as the first step in a long process of legisla-
98. Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 2-16 (1975).
99. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64, cert. denied
sub nom. Gargerv. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
100. NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.640 (1977) (the physician shall "give
weight" to the patient's declaration, but may consider other factors in de-
ciding whether to withdraw treatment); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(c) (1985)
(the attending physician "may rely" upon a declaration expressing a desire
not to have life prolonged).
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tive activity in this area. It is certain that advocates of eutha-
nasia view the living will as a first step; whether it constitutes
a first step towards euthanasia or not depends upon the will-
ingness of other political forces to use the legislative process
to work against such a development.
III. EUTHANASIA AND THE COURTS
A. Quinlan and Conroy
The decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1976
to permit the withdrawal of a mechanical respirator from
Karen Quinlan remains, ten years after its writing, the single
most important American legal authority on the subject of
euthanasia. 0 1 With one notable exception, 102 state courts ad-
dressing the question have accepted the Quinlan doctrine that
the constitutional right to privacy protects the right of an in-
competent patient to "decide" to forego medical treatment,
even if the patient is not capable of communication and has
left no clear indication of what her decision would be.' 03
The implications of this doctrine on the legal status of
euthanasia, however, have not always been clearly under-
stood. A number of commentators called the opinion a clear
step towards the legalization of euthanasia. 04 Others were
more cautious in their criticism, pointing out that although
the constitutional basis for the relief granted to Joseph Quin-
lan was dangerously broad, the actual order of the New
Jersey Supreme Court was carefully circumscribed, and could
have been supported by far less adventurous legal
reasoning. 05
101. Kamisar, The Real Quinlan Issue, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1985, at
A19, col. 1.
102. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266
(1981).
103. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 220 (1984); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195
Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d
1334 (Del. 1980); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So.
2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Colyer, 99 Wash.
2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983), modified, In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 102
Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
104. P. RAMSEY, supra note 79, at 294. ("The Quinlan case has gone a
long way toward obliterating the distinction between voluntary and invol-
untary euthanasia and weakening legal protection of life from involuntary
euthanasia.") See also Kamisar, supra note 101, at A19.
105. Horan, The Quinlan Case, in DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA
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Whether or not the treatment of Karen Quinlan consti-
tuted euthanasia, or was otherwise improper, there is increas-
ing support for the conclusion that, on balance, the Quinlan
opinion has weakened legal and ethical prohibitions against
euthanasia. Professor Kamisar has been among the leading
critics of the opinion on this score. Quinlan served the cause
of euthanasia, in his view, by enunciating a legal doctrine that
would inextricably link "voluntary" euthanasia (the professed
public policy goal of the supporters of euthanasia) with invol-
untary euthanasia. 106 Quinlan forged this link between the
"right to die" and the "right to kill" by defining the incom-
petent patient's constitutional rights of personal autonomy to
include a right to refuse life-preserving medical treatment,",7
by ruling that this right could be exercised on behalf of the
incompetent patient by a family member or guardian,'0 8 and
by holding that in cases of severe disability, such as Miss
Quinlan's, the state interest in preserving life could not check
the guardian's exercise of the patient's "privacy" rights. 0 9
The implications of this series of rulings for existing laws
against euthanasia are self-evident. If a "right to die" is given
constitutional protection, and if that right can be "exercised
on behalf of" an incompetent patient by imputing to that pa-
tient the desire to die, then all persons have a right to receive
"voluntary" euthanasia-whether or not they actually re-
quest it.l10 Quinlan, therefore provides a legal scheme by
which the legalization of voluntary euthanasia will inevitably
lead to the practice of all forms of euthanasia. Qualms re-
garding the practice of euthanasia could be satisfied, in each
case, by completing the ritual of "imputing" the will of the
patient to choose euthanasia. In that way, every act of eutha-
nasia could be considered "voluntary," at least by those will-
ing to be so comforted.
Further evidence of the danger Quinlan poses to existing
laws against euthanasia may be surmised from the court's dis-
cussion of whether the death of Karen Quinlan upon removal
of the respirator would constitute a homicide. The court an-
swered that insofar as the death resulted from existing natu-
ral causes-Karen's inability to breathe-it would not consti-
525, 526 (2d ed. 1980).
106. Kamisar, supra note 101.
107. 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
108. Id. at 37, 355 A.2d at 662.
109. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
110. P. RAMSEY, supra note 79, at 292-97.
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tute homicide. "[E]ven if it were regarded as homicide," the
court continued, "it would not be unlawful,"' presumably
because it would be exonerated under the constitutional right
to privacy." 2 The court's reading of the right to privacy,
therefore, encompasses constitutional protection for inten-
tional acts of killing. Accordingly, the avenue of constitu-
tional rights emerged from Quinlan as the most direct route
to avoid the application of homicide laws to acts of
euthanasia.
The decision in Conroy suggests that the New Jersey
court is uncomfortable with the expansiveness of the doc-
trines enunciated in Quinlan. In Conroy, the court set out to
create new legal standards to govern medical treatment deci-
sions for a particular class of patients: elderly, formerly com-
petent nursing home residents who are severely impaired and
have a relatively short life span, but are not imminently dying
or comatose. 18 In creating these standards, the court af-
firmed that the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is
protected under the common law, although it did not specifi-
cally hold, as did Quinlan, that the right is protected under
constitutional law as well. 114 However, Conroy departs rather
sharply from Quinlan on the question of patient autonomy in
circumstances where an incompetent patient has left no clear
directive regarding medical treatment. Moreover, Conroy im-
poses procedural safeguards on the withdrawal of treatment
that are far more draconian than those set forth in Quinlan.
These safeguards imply that the court is cognizant of the
close relationship between the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment and euthanasia." 5
Under Quinlan, the constitutional right of privacy ap-
plied regardless of whether the patient's specific wishes re-
garding medical treatment were known. Quinlan permits the
treatment decision to be made by a guardian acting on behalf
of the incompetent person under the principle of substituted
judgment." 6 After ruling that Karen's family should have the
right to decide whether Karen would choose to remain on
the respirator, the Quinlan court stated that "this decision
should be accepted by a society the overwhelming majority of
111. 70 N.J. at 51, 355 A.2d at 670.
112. Id. at 51-52, 355 A.2d at 670.
113. 98 N.J. at 342, 486 A.2d at 1219-20.
114. Id. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1223.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 128-34.
116. 70 N.J. at 42, 355 A.2d at 662.
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whose members would, we think, in similar circumstances,
exercise such a choice in the same way for themselves or for
those closest to them.9
11 7
The Conroy court took a very different view.
Many people may have spoken of their desires in general or
casual terms, or, indeed, never considered or resolved the
issue at all. In such cases, a surrogate decision-maker cannot
presume that treatment decisions made by a third party on
the patient's behalf will further the patient's right to self-
determination, since effectuating another person's right to
self-determination presupposes that the substitute decision-
maker knows what the person would have wanted. Thus, in
the absence of adequate proof of the patient's wishes, it is
naive to pretend that the right to self-determination serves as the
basis for substituted decision-making.118
As an alternative to substituted judgment, the court es-
tablished three tests under which decisions can be made to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment from patients in Miss Con-
roy's circumstances: a "subjective" test; a "limited-objective"
test; and a "pure-objective" test. In every case of the with-
drawal of life-preserving treatment from a terminally ill nurs-
ing home resident, the court ruled, one of the three tests
must be applied. Consistent with its reliance upon patient au-
tonomy as the guiding principle in such cases, the court indi-
cated that the choice of which test to apply depends upon
whether the patient has made a prior statement on the issue,
and the precise content and circumstances of that statement.
Under the subjective test,
life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn
from an incompetent patient when it is clear that the partic-
ular patient would have refused the treatment under the
circumstances involved. The standard we are enunciating is
a subjective one, consistent with the notion that the right
we are seeking to effectuate is a very personal right to con-
trol one's own life. The question is not what a reasonable or
average person would have chosen to do under the circum-
stances but what the particular patient would have done if
able to choose for himself."9
Evidence of the patient's intent can be established by written
117. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 662.
118. 98 N.J. at 364, 486 A.2d at 1231 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 360-61, 486 A.2d at 1229.
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documents, oral statements, or actions. 120 The probative
value of such evidence, the court ruled, will depend upon the
"remoteness, consistency and thoughtfulness" of the prior
statements, as well as their specificity regarding "the level of
impaired functioning and forms of medical treatment that
one would find tolerable . *..."'I' In addition, the medical
evidence must establish that the patient is "an elderly, incom-
petent nursing-home resident with severe and permanent
physical and mental impairments and a life expectancy of ap-
proximately one year or less."' 22
Outside of the subjective test, decisions to remove life-
sustaining treatments are severely restricted by Conroy.
Under the limited-objective test, such treatments can be with-
held from a patient in Claire Conroy's condition if there is
"some trustworthy evidence" that the patient would have re-
fused the treatment, and "the decision-maker is satisfied...
that the burdens of the patient's continued life with the treat-
ment outweigh the benefits of that life for him."' 12 However,
the benefits and burdens that may be taken into account are
restricted.
By this we mean that the patient is suffering, and will con-
tinue to suffer throughout the expected duration of his life,
unavoidable pain, and that the net burdens of his prolonged
life (the pain and suffering of his life with the treatment less
the amount and duration of pain that the patient would
likely experience if the treatment were withdrawn) mark-
edly outweigh any physical pleasure, emotional enjoyment,
or intellectual satisfaction that the patient may still be able
to derive from life. 24
Finally, under the pure-objective test, life-sustaining treat-
ment can be withdrawn from an incompetent patient when
the burdens of life-again defined as pain and suffer-
ing-outweigh the benefits, and when the further provision
of life-sustaining treatment "would be inhumane. 1 2 5 No sub-
jective evidence of the patient's desires is necessary under
this test. 26
The standards just outlined define the categories of pa-
120. Id. at 361, 486 A.2d at 1229-30.
121. Id. at 362, 486 A.2d at 1230.
122. Id. at 363, 486 A.2d at 1231.
123. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
126. Id.
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tients from whom treatment can be withdrawn. The court
also enunciated procedural safeguards to ensure that such de-
cisions are made only in cases of duly-qualified patients.
1. There must be clear and convincing evidence that the
patient does not have and never will regain the capacity to
make decisions for himself. This evidence must be provided
by at least two physicians with appropriate qualifications who
have personally examined the patient. 12 7
2. Whenever a decision to remove treatment under ei-
ther of the three tests is contemplated, notice must be given
to the Office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Eld-
erly. The ombudsman must take evidence from the attending
physician and nursing staff, and arrange for an independent
medical examination by two physicians.12 8
3. If all of the physicians corroborate the medical diag-
nosis, if the ombudsman concurs, and if one of the three tests
is satisfied, the guardian may then decide to withhold or with-
draw life-sustaining treatment. In cases where the limited-ob-
jective or objective test is employed, the family of the patient
must also concur in the decision.
1 29
The Conroy opinion clearly illustrates the difficulty of
placing limits on any form of legalized euthanasia. Under the
subjective test, the court has arguably legalized certain forms
of passive euthanasia. A person who has executed a specific
directive, and who is suffering from a terminal illness that
will cause death within a year, may be removed from all med-
ical interventions, even from mechanical feeding. There does
not appear to be any countervailing state interest which may
interfere with this decision, and the ombudsman is apparently
bound to honor it unless there is evidence of fraud. 30
Having legalized passive euthanasia for this small cate-
gory of patients, the court created an elaborate set of restric-
tions to prevent euthanasia from being practiced upon other
patients. The requirement that patients under the remaining
two tests be in unremitting pain effectively removes a large
number of potential candidates for euthanasia, including
Claire Conroy, the patient whose treatment was at issue. In
addition, the requirements, if followed, will make it more dif-
ficult for physicians to make any decision concerning life-sus-
127. Id. at 382, 486 A.2d at 1241.
128. Id. at 383-84, 486 A.2d at 1241-42.
129. Id. at 384-85, 486 A.2d at 1242.
130. Id. at 385, 486 A.2d at 1242 (noting that ombudsman may refer
cases of questionable criminal abuse of patients to county prosecutor).
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taining treatment for a patient in Miss Conroy's condition.
For example, a decision to follow a non-aggressive treatment
plan for a patient in the circumstances of Miss Conroy may
include a decision to withhold certain forms of life-sustaining
treatment. 181 If all-such decisions are subject to the Conroy
requirements for second medical opinions,, and investigation
by the ombudsman, the burdens upon medical practice could
be profound. Thus, by eradicating the potential for abuse of
the limited right to euthanasia that is created by Conroy, the
court may have unduly disturbed the process of making per-
fectly valid decisions to forego aggressive therapy upon the
terminally ill. Professor Kamisar wrote that it is practically
impossible to write euthanasia legislation that will both pro-
tect the right to euthanasia for those of sound mind who re-
quest it, and prevent abusive practices.' This thesis is borne
out by the complex procedures set forth in the Conroy
opinion.133
131. See Brophy, No. 85E0009-G1 slip op. at 18-21 (Mass. Probate Ct.,
Norfolk, Oct. 21, 1985), rev'd in relevant part, No. 4152 (Mass. Sup. Jud.
Ct. Sept. 11, 1986).
132. Kamisar, supra note 1, at 978-81.
133. One member of the New Jersey court agreed that the proce-
dures established in Conroy are too cumbersome to be of practical use. Al-
though he concurred in the result, Justice Handler indicated in his separate
opinion that he would analyze the case from a different starting point than
that chosen by his colleagues, and arrive at a different result. The proper
starting point, he said, is not the doctrine of patient autonomy, but that of
patient "best interest." 96 N.J. at 392-93, 486 A.2d at 1246-47 (Handler,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It would be "amiss," Justice
Handler stated, to stress notions of personal autonomy in the context of
Miss Conroy's situation. Id., 486 A.2d at 1246. Reliance upon personal au-
tonomy cannot help address the situation, because such patients have lost
the ability to choose. As an alternative to notions of privacy and autonomy,
Justice Handler proposed that these cases be guided by the court's applica-
tion of equitable principles. Id. at 393, 486 A.2d at 1246-47.
Justice Handler's application of equity to this case could achieve a legal
result that is both less intrusive and less prone to creating a risk of eutha-
nasia. He would apparently limit the withdrawal of life-saving treatment to
patients who are truly in extremis.
The person should be terminally ill and facing imminent death.
There should also be present the permanent loss of conscious
thought processes in the form of a comatose state or profound un-
consciousness. Further, there should be the irreparable failure of
at least one major and essential bodily organ or system.
Id. at 398, 486 A.2d at 1249. Justice Handler would permit a wider range
of criteria to influence a decision to withdraw treatment: in addition to
physical pain, he would consider overall physical condition and deteriora-
tion, as well as sensory, emotional, and cognitive functioning. Id. at 397-98,
486 A.2d at 1249.
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B. Bouvia and Jobes
Judicial developments in the wake of Conroy, have, as
some had feared, largely ignored the carefully wrought safe-
guards of that opinion, and have expanded legal protection
for acts of euthanasia by omission of nourishment and fluids.
These developments, if unchecked, are likely to destroy the
tenuous balance arrived at in the years since Quinlan between
the right of the terminally ill individual to refuse life-pro-
longing medical treatment, and the interests of society in
maintaining a strict legal standard against euthanasia.34 In-
deed, the increasingly prevalent judicial opinion is that, in
the case of certain patients, there is no state interest in the
preservation of life, and hence, no state interest in prohibit-
ing at least passive acts of euthanasia. Continued acceptance
of this trend will cause a fundamental re-alignment in Ameri-
can law similar to that caused on the question of abortion by
Roe v. Wade.18 Just as Roe has made it exceedingly difficult
for states to limit in any way the practice of abortion, these
decisions may eventually render the state incapable of effec-
tively proscribing euthanasia.
In the case of In reJobes,' a New Jersey Superior Court
judge granted the petition brought by the husband of a 31-
year old, severely brain damaged woman, to remove the jeju-
nostomy tube through which liquid nourishment is provided
Despite enlarging upon the "quality of life" factors that the majority
would consider acceptable, Justice Handler's approach, if it were strictly
applied and if adequate enforcement ability were in place, could avoid
many of the dangers inherent in the majority's opinion. For example, the
majority would permit the withdrawal of treatment from any patient with a
life expectancy of one year or less-an expansive and imprecise period that
could encourage the rendering of ill-founded patient prognoses. The stan-
dard of "imminently dying" proposed by Justice Handler, if not absolutely
precise, at least establishes a period that is much shorter than one year, and
thus, a period of life expectancy about which a more confident prognosis
may be made. Furthermore, the very cumbersomeness of the safeguards
proposed by the majority are likely to be a disincentive to compliance on
the part of health-care providers, and serve to perpetuate the myth that
the law is incapable of offering sound and practical guidance in these areas.
Justice Handler's opinion is not perfect, and may carry its own blind spot
to the dangers of euthanasia's "slippery slope," but after pouring through
the contortions of the majority opinion, it has'a healthy ring of common
sense to it.
134. See, Horan & Grant, Prolonging Life and Withdrawing Treatment:
Legal Issues, 50 Linacre Q. 153, 166-68 (1983).
135. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
136. No. C-4971-85E (N.J. Super Ct. Chancery Div., Morris County,
Apr. 23, 1986).
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to her. As stated succinctly in the opinion of the court, "[i]f
the feeding tube is removed, dehydration and starvation will
follow, and Ms. Jobes will die. If feeding continues, she will
live indefinitely."" 7 The court authorized the husband to di-
rect the removal of the feeding tube, finding
by clear and convincing evidence that Nancy Ellen Jobes is
in a persistent vegetative state; that, if competent, Ms. Jobes
would not want to be sustained in this mental and physical
condition by artificial tube feeding, and that the plaintiff is
a suitable person . . . to carry out his wife's wishes with re-
spect to the discontinuance of feeding through artificial
means.
138
Because the condition of Nancy Jobes was different from that
of Claire Conroy, and the treatment in question was different
from that which was sought to be removed from Karen Quin-
lan, the Jobes opinion was, of necessity, a tapestry reflecting
elements of both Conroy and Quinlan. It remains to be seen
whether the New Jersey Supreme Court will choose to re-
weave the trial court's handiwork, but there are several ques-
tions in the case which might merit the type of plenary re-
view the New Jersey Supreme Court seems prone to engage
in when faced with a case of this variety. 39
137. Id., slip op. at 1.
138. Id. at 2-3.
139. Among the more controversial aspects of the Jobes opinion are
its resolution of conflicting medical evidence on the precise nature of Ms.
Jobes' neurological impairment, its adoption of somewhat vague prior
statements by Ms. Jobes as "clear and convincing evidence" of a prior in-
tent to renounce artificial feeding, and its decision to permit the with-
drawal of feeding despite the prognosis of indefinite lifespan, a factor that
was present neither in Quinlan nor in Conroy.
As the court acknowledged, the five expert physicians who examined
Mrs. Jobes "disagree[d] sharply about her ability to follow simple com-
mands." Id. at 6. Three of the doctors, Henry R. Liss, Fred Plum, and
David Levy, testified that they were unable to elicit anything other than a
startle response from Mrs. Jobes. This would be consistent with a diagnosis
of "persistent vegetative state," described by the court as a state where a
person is "permanently devoid of all cognitive functions." Id. at 5. Two
other physicians of equivalent credentials, Maurice Victor and Allan Rop-
per, claimed that they were able to elicit responses to commands from Mrs.
Jobes, and thus concluded that, while severely brain-damaged, Mrs. Jobes is
not in a persistent vegetative state. Id. at 8. In addition to the testimony of
Ropper and Victor, several members of the nursing home staff testified
that they were able to elicit responses from Mrs. Jobes showing evidence of
cognitive activity.
The trial court resolved this dispute by noting that "all of the witnesses
who claimed to elicit command responses from Ms. Jobes . . . believe that
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The decision of the California Court of Appeal panel in
Bouvia v. Superior Court140 constitutes the most forthright ju-
dicial acknowledgment yet of the "right" to undergo eutha-
nasia by omission. Ms. Bouvia had achieved notoriety when
her earlier petition to compel a private hospital to permit her
to starve herself to death while under the hospital's care was
rejected.14 After reportedly renouncing her suicidal intent,
Ms. Bouvia, a quadripelegic afflicted with severe cerebral
palsy, experienced difficulty in finding a suitable living ar-
rangement. 42 In her most recent petition, to prevent a pub-
lic hospital from feeding her through a naso-gastric tube, it is
not clear whether Ms. Bouvia wishes to die, since she con-
sumes a partial liquid diet.14 3 Ms. Bouvia is reportedly in con-
it is a violation of professional ethics and personal morality to withhold or
withdraw tube feeding . . . Their sincere opposition to the withholding
of nutrition from any patient . . . have caused them to see signs of intelli-
gence where no such intelligence exists." Id. at 9. The court's finding of
bias is curious, because each of the physicians who testified that there was
no response to commands stated an equally strong opinion that the feeding
tube should be removed from Mrs. Jobes. Why the position of an eminent
physician on the ethics of removing feeding should disqualify that expert
only if he is opposed to removing feeding is a rule of evidence not fully
explicated by the trial court.
An appellate court in Jobes will also have to square the trial court's find-
ing that the prior statements made by Mrs. Jobes on the subject of medical
treatment, none of which mentioned artificial feeding in particular, could
rise to the level of "clear and convincing evidence" of her intent to forego
tube feeding. Id. at 9. At another point in the opinion, the court appears to
backtrack from this holding, stating that Mrs. Jobes fits the "limited objec-
tive" test under Conroy. See supra note 123. If this is the case, then an ap-
pellate court may review the trial court's finding that Conroy's restriction
on withdrawal of treatment under the limited-objective test to terminally ill
patients in unremitting pain should not prevent the relief sought by the
family of Mrs. Jobes. The trial court has effectively expanded Conroy and
Quinlan to a factual situation, the non-terminal but profoundly impaired
patient, that was not contemplated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
either of the two prior cases. In Quinlan, of course, the patient unexpect-
edly lived for nine years after removal of the respirator. However, the un-
derlying assumption of the Supreme Court opinion in Quinlan was that
Miss Quinlan's prognosis for life was poor, and that she was slipping closer
to death with each passing day. 70 N.J. at 57. Although this turned out not
to be the case, one cannot presume that the rule established in Quinlan was
intended to apply to the different set of factual circumstances presented by
the condition of Mrs. Jobes.
140. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
141. Bouvia v. County of Riverside, No. 159780 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Riverside Dec. 16, 1983), Record vol. 9 at 1238-50.
142. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
143. Id.
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stant pain for which she is administered morphine.""'
Regardless of the precise nature of Ms. Bouvia's intent,
the opinion of the Court of Appeal is clearly broad enough to
impart to Ms. Bouvia an absolute constitutional right to re-
fuse medical treatment, including nutrition and hydration,
even if the effect of that refusal is to commit suicide. " 'The
right of a competent adult patient to refuse medical treat-
ment is a constitutionally guaranteed right which must not be
abridged.' "I The court rejected the contention that Ms.
Bouvia's right ought to be limited by the state interests in the
preservation of life and the prevention of suicide.
Bouvia's decision to forego medical treatment or life-sup-
port through a mechanical means belongs to her. It is not a
medical decision for her physicians to make. Neither is it a
legal question whose soundness is to be resolved by lawyers
or judges. It is not a conditional right subject to approval
by ethics committees or courts of law. It is a moral and phil-
osophical decision that, being a competent adult, is her's
[sic] alone.1"6
The court likewise concluded that it is acceptable for Ms.
Bouvia to make a decision that will hasten death on the basis
of her perception of a poor quality of life.
Although alert, bright, sensitive, perhaps even brave and
feisty, she must lie immobile, unable to exist except
through physical acts of others. Her mind and spirit may be
free to take great flights but she herself is imprisoned and
must lie physically helpless subject to the ignominy, embar-
rassment, humiliation and dehumanizing aspects created by
her helplessness. We do not believe it is the policy of this
State that all and every life must be preserved against the
will of the sufferer. It is incongruous, if not monstrous, for
medical practitioners to assert their right to preserve a life
that someone else must live, or, more accurately, endure,
for "15 to 20 years."""
The court deemed the state interest in preventing death by
suicide to be irrelevant, and indeed, posited that the right to
suicide may be included in the constitutional right to
144. Id.
145. Id. at 304 (quoting Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d
186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984)).
146. Id. at 305.
147. Id.
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privacy.148
The concurring opinion of Justice Compton went fur-
ther, holding that there is a fundamental and absolute right
to commit suicide, and to demand the assistance of others,
including the medical profession, if one is unable to perform
the act.
Elizabeth apparently has made a conscious and in-
formed choice that she prefers death to continued existence
in her helpless and, to her, intolerable condition. I believe
that she has an absolute right to effectuate that decision.
This state and the medical profession instead of frustrating
her desire, should be attempting to relieve her suffering by
permitting and in fact assisting her to die with ease and dig-
nity. The fact that she is forced to suffer the ordeal of self-
starvation to achieve her objective is in itself inhumane.
The right to die is an integral part of our right to con-
trol our own destinies so long as the rights of others are not
affected. That right should, in my opinion, include the abil-
ity to enlist assistance from others, including the medical
profession, in making death as painless and quick as
possible.' 49
In the opinion of Justice Compton, the medical profession
should have no qualms in acceding to the requests of individ-
uals for euthanasia or assisted suicide, as long as the threat of
legal liability is removed. Although the Hippocratic Oath ex-
pressly states: "I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if
asked," Justice Compton notes that the medical profession
"has already accommodated a deviation from that part of the
[Hippocratic] oath" that proscribed induced abortion. 5 ' Pre-
sumably, in Justice Compton's view, the accommodation of
medicine to legalized euthanasia and suicide would be no
more difficult to achieve.
The line of California cases culminating in Bouvia'5 '
leaves that state with, at best, a very fluid public policy to-
wards euthanasia, and, at worst, a policy that is openly in
favor of mercy-killing. Society should take note that the most
aggressive statement of an absolute right to die has emerged
148. Id. at 306. ("[A] desire to terminate one's life is probably the
ultimate exercise of one's right to privacy.")
149. Id. at 307. (Compton, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 308.
151. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 220 (1984); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195
Cal. Rptr. 484 (1984).
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in a case not involving an elderly, terminally ill patient, or a
comatose patient, but a person who is found to be rational
and competent. The court's justification for euthanasia in the
case of Elizabeth Bouvia is that she suffers from a severe
handicap. The court's characterization of the quality of Ms.
Bouvia's existence as inhumane and intolerable opens the
door for similar negative quality of life assessments for other
persons with disabilities. Although Ms. Bouvia suffers great
physical pain, the court's quality-of-life judgment focused
greater attention on the perceived "indignity" of being
quadripelegic and thus requiring the assistance of others for
basic bodily functions. The logical conclusion to draw from
Bouvia is that, at least in the eyes of this particular appellate
panel, a state policy which holds life to be of intrinsic value
regardless of handicap or other impairment is irrational and
will not be permitted to stand against the right to terminate
life. This is a sufficient doctrinal foundation for the legaliza-
tion of euthanasia.
Although Bouvia does not create a point of no return in
the development of legal doctrine on euthanasia, we have
clearly reached a juncture where jurists, physicians and soci-
ety can no longer avoid confrontation on the legality and mo-
rality of mercy-killing. Prior to Bouvia and Jobes, it was possi-
ble to hope that the damage caused to our public policy
against euthanasia and mercy-killing by the current debate
over the provision of life-sustaining treatment might be con-
trollable. The courts had generally recognized the impor-
tance of the state interests involved, and had created safe-
guards to limit the application of the right to refuse medical
treatment. Now that these safeguards are being tossed aside,
the hope for a legal, medical and ethical consensus against
mercy-killing is fleeting.1 52
152. In addition to the opinions discussed, significant rulings have ap-
peared in Brophy v. New Engand Sinai Hosp., Inc., No. 85E0009-GI
(Mass. Probate Ct., Norfolk, Oct. 21, 1985), rev'd in part, No. 4152 (Mass.
Sup. Jud. Ct. Sept. 11, 1986), and in Corbett v. D'Allessandro, No. 85-
1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., Apr. 18, 1986), petition for review denied, No.
68,817 (Fla. Sup. Ct., July 30, 1986). In Corbett, decided two days after
Bouvia and five days prior toJobes, the court reversed a trial court holding
that the exclusion of nutrition and hydration from the definition of "life-
prolonging procedure" under the Florida living will statute (see FLA. STAT.
§ 765.03(3) (1984)) precluded the withdrawal of a nasogastric tube from an
elderly woman in a persistent vegetative state. The woman died just two
days after the hearing in the trial court, and prior to the trial court ruling,
but the courts nevertheless retained jurisdiction due to the nature of the
issues. Slip op. at 2.
[Vol. 2
"SMALL BEGINNINGS" OF EUTHANASIA
IV. CONCLUSION
Examination of living will legislation, and court decisions
such as Quinlan, and Conroy, Bouvia, and Jobes, reveal the
complexity of the task of restricting euthanasia. The legal is-
sues involved are numerous, and include two of the most fun-
damental aspects of the rule of law: the protection of life and
the integrity of personal decision-making. Compounding
these legal issues are ever-changing social and medical
parameters.
The difficulty of the endeavor, however, should not stint
the effort to uphold, preserve, and strengthen existing legal
prohibitions against euthanasia. The testimony of Dr. Alex-
The court of appeals held that under Florida law, the right of a termi-
nally ill patient to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment includes the
right to refuse artificial means of nutrition and hydration. The court did
not display rigorous examination of the issue, but nevertheless concluded:
"We are unable to distinguish on a legal, scientific or a moral basis between
those artificial measures that sustain life - whether by means of "forced
sustenance" or "forced" continuance of vital functions - of the vegeta-
tive, comatose patient who would soon expire without the use of those arti-
ficial means." Id. at 6. But see discussion in notes 24 and 70, and text ac-
companying notes 69-72, supra. Corbett gives somewhat greater
acknowledgment to the interests in preserving life that may be compro-
mised by permitting decisions to remove food and water, but in the end,
demonstrates a shallow understanding of the issue.
We forcefully affirm that Life having been endowed by our Crea-
tor should not be lightly taken nor relinquished. We recognize,
however, that we are also endowed with a certain amount of dig-
nity and the right to the "Pursuit of Happiness." When, there-
fore, it can be determined . . . that Life has, through causes be-
yond our control, reached the unconscious and vegetative state
where all that remains is the forced function of the body's vital
functions, including the artificial sustenance of the body itself,
then we recognize the right to allow the natural consequence of
the removal of those artificial life sustaining measures.
Slip op. at 7. Feeding, of course, does not constitute the "forced function"
of a vital bodily function, whether nourishment is provided through the
mouth or by other means. The Corbett court failed, as have other jurists, to
explain why the assistance of medical and nursing personnel in supplying
nourishment to a patient should make the provision of nourishment an op-
tional measure. What started in Quinlan as license to withdraw invasive
medical treatment when prognosis for life is dim has expanded to embrace
the basic provision of nourishment. This is made evident by the divided, 4-
3 opinion of the Massachusetts court in Brophy. The Brophy majority held
that the distinctions drawn by the trial court, and by several parties and
amici, between the provision of nutrition and of more evasive forms of life-
support, are inconsequential. The Brophy dissenters strongly disputed this
point, arguing that the majority opinion constituted an endorsement of sui-
cide and euthanasia.
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ander is more trenchant and relevant to American society
than it was forty years ago. This testimony establishes that no
just society can risk the profound evil of devaluing the life of
any human. being, no matter how profoundly that life may be
impaired. Those who care for the terminally ill and the dis-
abled, and those who face such impairments, are searching
for more humane ways for persons to spend their last days in
this life. There is, however, a continuing and ever-present
danger that the quest for humane treatment may be infil-
trated by the odious philosophy, in Dr. Alexander's words,
"that there is such a thing as a life not worthy to be lived."
The danger of this philosophy to individual persons and
to society is sufficiently great that all legal developments, such
as the ones discussed in this article, ought to be carefully
scrutinized to determine if they in any way contribute to its
advance. Analysis of the URTIA and other living will legisla-
tion, as well as the opinions in Quinlan, Conroy, Jobes, and
Bouvia, establishes that these developments may be used to
advance the philosophy of euthanasia, and thus to weaken le-
gal restrictions against it. The testimony of Leo Alexander
establishes why developments that are so tainted ought to be
resisted. Resistance, however, is not likely to be sufficient to
accomplish the task of overcoming the "small beginnings" of
euthanasia of which Leo Alexander has warned us. Indeed,
such resistance will be futile unless effective legislative and
judicial alternatives are constructed to resolve the social and
political controversies which will continue to arise concerning
our treatment of the aged, the terminally ill, and the severely
impaired.
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